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NOTES

Burying Lochner Why Courts Should Reject Coming
Attempts to Revive Economic Due Process
Brandon R Magner'
The rationalstudy of law is still to a large extent the study of
history. Historymustbe apartofthe study, because without it we
cannot know the precise scope ofrules which it is our business to
know. It is a part of the rationalstudy, because it is the first step
towardan enbghtenedscepticism [sic], thatis, toward a dehberate
reconsideration of the worth of those rules. When you get the
dragon out ohis cave on to the plain and in the dayhght, you can
count his teeth and claws, and seejust what is his strength. But to
get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or
to tame him andmake him a useful animal.'

'J.D. expected 2018, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professors
Brian L. Frye, Franklin L. Runge, and Paul S. Salamanca for giving guidance and feedback at various
points during the writing process of this project. Further thanks are owed to Professors David E. Bernstein
and William E. Forbath for critiquing a draft of this Note. Finally, the author extends his gratitude to the
millions of workers in America who built this nation through their labor, and for which the law has so
routinely failed to provide protection. This Note received the 2017 Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC
Scholarship for Outstanding Student Note.
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,469 (1897).
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INTRODUCTION

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote his canonical dissent in Lochner v. New
York eight years after penning that vivid analogy of dragons and history. Much had
changed in Holmes's life and the landscape of American law during that time. He
had been elevated from the Massachusetts judiciary to the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1902,4 where his brothers on the bench had recently crafted the
"liberty of contract" doctrine that steered Lochner's majority.s Holmes came upon a
Court that embraced economic due process as a limit on state authority and
legislative will-a doctrinal conclusion that the new Justice would not subscribe to.
If the Constitution is a great cave, then economic due process is one of its ancient
caverns. It is walled off from the various other tunnels of the Fourteenth
Amendment's chambers, tucked away and buried in history by the seismic forces of
the New Deal. Behind that rubble lies many fearsome beasts of so-called judicial
activism: Adair,' Adkins,' and Coppage, among others. But as the legend goes, no
monster was as feared as the Lochnerdragon. It ruled a generation and defined an
era.' In a fiery salvo, Lochner and its legion struck down any federal or state-passed
economic regulation that encroached too far upon newly enshrined private contract
rights.'o Ostensibly, by protecting a worker's "right to purchase or to sell labor," the
Court was preventing "unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference[s] with
the right of the individual to his personal liberty[.]"" But what ensued was a dearth
of regulatory (and judicial) safeguards at a time that the American worker was most

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Olver Wendell Holmes, Jr., BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/people/oliver-wendellholmes-jr-9342405 [https:/perma.cc/44VD-AWDQJ (last updated Mar. 16, 2016).
s See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-91 (1897) (holding that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the right to contract); see general/yLochner, 198 U.S. 45.
6 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1908) (invalidating a federal attempt to prohibit
contracts that barred workers from joining unions).
7 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554-55, 559-60 (1923) (invalidating a federal minimum
wage law for women).
' Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating a state attempt to prohibit the type of
"yellow-dog contracts" at issue in Adair).
' See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) ("As
the history of the Lochnererademonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial
intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.");
see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 273-74 (2012) ("Lochneris ... not just a case, but an era and an attitude.");
David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York A CentenniaRetrospective,83 WASH. U. L.Q 1469,152021 (2005) (detailing the origins and spread of the phrase "Lochnerera"in modern academia).
o See Barry Friedman, The History ofthe CountermajoitarianDifficulty, Part Three: The Lesson
ofLochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383, 1391-96 (2001) (recounting the traditional interpretation of the
Lochner-era Court).
" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53,56 (1905).
4
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vulnerable to exploitation. 2 For forty years, the dragon roamed free in what William
Howard Taft would proudly call "the most conservative country in the world.""
There are those who wish to sift through the rubble and excavate the ruins. A
dedicated group of Lochner archaeologists have called into question the Court's
repudiation of economic due process in favor of New Deal-era jurisprudence.' 4 To
this medley of advocates, judges, and scholars, Lochner is not a monster at all, but
rather a watchful guardian against oppressive legislation.s Moreover, its supporters
disagree that the doctrine has truly met its demise. At its core, the liberty of contract
is no different from modern carve-outs in substantive due process: its viability
requires a majority ofJustices to regard its unenumerated protections as "life, liberty,
or property" implicitly worth embracing.' While the Court has not preserved
economic liberty as a fundamental right since at least 1937,'7 the Constitution itself
does not prohibit Justices from re-introducing a doctrine into the Due Process canon.
In this respect, the dragon is merely dormant-not dead.
At the outset of this Note, the author concedes to the revisionists this ancillary
point.'" Ipso facto, because unenumerated rights cannot disappear from an Article or
Amendment, they are not vulnerable to endless interpretation like textual provisions.
Just as the liberty of contract was "'interpreted' into being" and "interpreted into
obscurity,"" the doctrine can be resuscitated through the Court's modem
fundamental rights analysis.20 But, the author contends that "low-grade" Lochnerism
has already reemerged in federal courts,2 ' and that the ensuing circuit split on this
matter has forced liberal jurists into a difficult spot.22 The author additionally argues
that judges should resist calls for heightened scrutiny of economic legislation and
12

See, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 377-406 (Harper

Perennial Modem Classics 2015) (1980); Caleb Crain, There Was Blood, NEWYORKER,Jan. 19,2009,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/01/19/there-was-blood [https://perma.cc/CF7P-XN5M]
(revisiting the horrors of the "Ludlow Massacre" of striking miners in Colorado).
13

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER: 1919-1933, THE AGE OF

ROOSEVELT 60 (1957); see inKfa notes 56-94 and accompanying text.
14 See infra Section II.A.
's See infr Section I.B.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)
(endorsing the protection of fundamental rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to the
extent that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed").
" SeeW. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage
law for women and effectively overruling Lochner).
18 As is the case suigeneis to historical revisionism, this author does not use the term "revisionists"
here pejoratively. See generaly James McPherson, Revisionist Historians, AM. HIST. ASS'N:
PERSPECTIVES
ON
HISTORY,
Sept.
2003,
https://www.historians.org/publications-anddirectories/perspectives-on-history/september-2003/revisionist-historians
[https://perma.cc/5LX5NQUT]. Moreover, Lochnerrevisionists generally embrace this label. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1473
("Revisionists have successfully challenged conventional wisdom . . . .").
1'9 G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 40 (1978).
20 See generalyPAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK. ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 187
(1998) (declaring that, given more recent displays of judicial activism from the Court, "Lochneris not
dead").
21 See infra notes 221-225 and accompanying text; infra Section III.A.
22 See infra Section IV.C.
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that further attempts to awaken the Lochner dragon risk repeating the errors of a
rightfully discredited period in constitutional law and economic thought. While
Justice Holmes may have embellished the Lochner majority's intentions in his
dissent,23 and though liberal jurists have long abandoned his prohibitive stance on al
forms of substantive due process,2 4 Holmes was ultimately correct to deny economic
liberty its status as a "useful animal."2 5
Part I of this Note recapitulates the history of the liberty of contract at the
Supreme Court: its origins and ascension as a constitutional protection, and
economic due process's eventual demise at the hands of the New Deal. Part II reviews
the doctrine's resurgence among libertarian jurists, as well as the possible impact of
their advocacy upon mainstream adherents of originalism. Part III examines a line of
cases where courts have already taken on a more activist role regarding economic
legislation, which offer fertile ground for more expansive excavation. Part IV
challenges the overarching revisionist goal of unleashing Lochnerfrom its confines,
and it offers a concession to libertarians that preserves the constitutionality of
redistributive legislation. Finally, Part V concludes the Note by evaluating Holmes's
grand metaphor in the context of this century-old battle.
I. FORGED IN FIRE, FELLED BY MAIDS: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF ECONOMIC
LIBERTY AT THE SUPREME COURT

To be sure, this Note is not another case of "crying wolf' about Lochner, though
it is true that the "Lochnerbogeyman"is a common trope in substantive due process
scholarship. 26 As John Hart Ely famously described the post-Lochner, pre-Roe v.
Wade span of constitutional law, those critical of the Warren Court's expansion of
unenumerated rights would often "cry[] Lochner" on occasions where its libeial
Justices were perceived to have enforced their personal ideals of liberty and equality

' SeeJamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARv. L. REV. 379, 418-19 (2011) (responding to the
argument that the Lochnercourtinvented the right to contract by observing that "[t]he right had been
recognized in prior cases, including unanimously in Allgeyer v. Louisian").
24
Randy E. Barnett, Foreword, What's So WickedAboutLochner?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &LIBERTY 325,
325-29 (2005) (illustrating the eventual embrace of Lochnerian ideals by liberals in cases such as Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
25 The author utilizes the phrase "economic liberty" throughout this Note strictly to engage its
proponents on their own terms. But, in the greater arena of constitutional discourse, this author is loath
to characterize the Fourteenth Amendment's conception of liberty as an inherently anti-government
initiative. While libertarians decry legislation that produces excessive barriers to entry in certain
occupational markets, see infra Section III.B, one could argue that our most economically disadvantaged
citizens benefit more from federal guarantees ofbaseline wages, rights to unionize and collectively bargain,
safety in the workplace, and access to affordable healthcare than from passive, non-interventionist
governments.
26 Patel v. Texas Dep't of Licensing, 469 S.W.3d 69, 94 n.11 (Tex.
2015).
27 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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in lieu of textual fidelity.28 Thus, when a true case of "Lochnering" came down from
the Supreme Court in the form of Roe's privacy protections and trimester framework,
the calls for alarm mostly fell on deaf ears. 29
But this is no false harbinger. In a comprehensive analysis of modern Lochner
revisionism, Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith argue that new-school trends in
conservative jurisprudence have not only laid the groundwork for a resurgence of
economic liberty, but perhaps started constructing its foundation.3 o Whereas the
judiciary spurred the brunt of liberal legal theory in the latter twentieth century,
forcing liberal academics to react to the courts' rapid expansion of substantive due
process, 1 libertarian scholars have done most of the movement's heavy lifting. This
assortment of advocates, politicians, and professors have drawn the blueprints and
plotted the land, Colby and Smith observe, and "it will not be long before the
bulldozers break ground."32
But, before examining the methods by which the revisionists have turned the
tide, it is important to understand what about the Lochner dragon excites its
admirers and terrifies its detractors. For that, we must peer back into the nineteenth
century and trace the origins of economic due process through its adoption by a
majority of the Court. This story begins not with an epic clash of industrial capital
and organized labor, as this era is often thematically framed, but with the rise of
the temperance movement in the Great Plains.
A. Ongins (1887-1897)
One of the first articulations of Lochner-erajurisprudence appears in Mugler v
Kansas.34 In 1880, the Kansas state legislature amended its constitution to prohibit
the "manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors" except for licensed medical or
scientific purposes, and it passed an act to carry the law into effect.s Pete Mugler
was subsequently indicted under the act for the unlicensed commercial use of his

2

8 John Hart Ely, The Wages ofCrying WolEA Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 94344 (1973).
29 Id. at 944.
30 Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return ofLochner, 100 CORNELL L.
REv. 527, 532

(2015).
31 id.
32 Id. As one professor adroitly summarizes, "Court-watchers across the political spectrum
have cried
wolf before; but this time the paw prints are very large indeed." Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v.
Ameica, DEMOCRACY (Winter 2012), https://democracyjoumal.org/magazine/23/the-roberts-court-vamerica/ [https://perma.cc/ZAM4-ELXD].
" See, e.g., Rob Hunter, Waitingfor SCOTUS, JACOBIN, Spring 2014, at 35,37 ("The [Lochnerera] Court became an important conservative veto point during the showdowns between labor and capital
prior to the New Deal."); see also Karl Kautsky, SocialstAgitation Among Farmersin America, 3 INT'L
SOCIALIST REv. 148, 148 (1902) ("Capitalism makes its greatest progress in America. There it reigns
with the most unlimited brutality and carries the class antagonisms to a climax.").
34 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
3s Id. at 655.
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6
brewery based in Saline County, Kansas. Mugler argued that the uncompensated
devaluation of his brewery amounted to a taking and was constitutionally barred by
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."'
The salient issue in Mugler appearsto be a regulatory taking matter, which is the
focus of most of the contemporary analysis of the case." But more immediately
important were the nascent guidelines it fomented for future Progressive-era
legislation. In his opinion for an eight-member majority, Justice John Marshall
Harlan installed a sort of proto-rational basis test in holding against Mugler, stating
that it was the legislative branch's role "to determine, primarily, what measures are
appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or
the public safety."' But, Justice Harlan continued, "It does not at all follow that every
statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends, is to be accepted as a
legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State."' Although "every possible
presumption [of validity] is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute," that
presumption was rebuttable "[i]f . .. a statute purporting to have been enacted to
protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or
substantial relation to those objects, oris a palpableinvasion ofights secured by the
fundamental law[.]41 In determining whether the state's good intentions justified
42
the regulation of the manufacture and sale of alcohol, Mugler represented the
Court's first in-depth examination of the relationship between the states' police
power and a substantive element of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.43

36

Id. at 653.

" Id. at 657. The devaluation, Mugler argued, was evident in the fact that the building's machinery
was "of little value if not used for the purpose of manufacturing beer." Id.
" See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Cate, Back to Basics: The South CarolinaSupreme CourtReturns to the
Mugler v. Kansas Era of Regrdatory Takings Doctine, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
237, 239 (1992); Thomas A. Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years ofSupreme CourtRegulatory
TakingDoctrine: The Principlesof "NoxiousUse," "AveageReciprocity ofAdvantage, and "Bundleof
Rights"from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 653, 660 (1987).
'9 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661; see also Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, RationalBasis with
Economic Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY, 1055, 1061-66 (2014) (paralleling Justice Harlan's reasoning
in Muglerto later developments in rational basis jurisprudence).
4 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
42 Harlan did not mince his words regarding alcohol's effect on the populace, stating that "it is difficult
to perceive any ground for the judiciary to declare that the prohibition by Kansas of the manufacture or
sale, within her limits, of intoxicating liquors for general use there as a beverage, is not fairly adapted to
the end of protecting the community against the evils which confessedly result from the excessive use of
ardent spirits." Id. at 661-62.
4 Hippler, supranote 38, at 65 9-60.
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Dissenting in solo was Justice Stephen Field, the Court's resident arch
conservative" and its most strident defender of laissez-faire principles.45
hile
Justice Harlan installed a framework through which state legislation could be
thwarted by substantive claims of due process (but declined to afford commercial
brewing such protection)," Justice Field painted with a broader brush. Echoing his
fiery dissents in the Slaughter-House Cases and Munn v. 1Ifnois," in which he
vocalized his career-defining belief that the Fourteenth Amendment offered
substantive protections as well as procedural ones,49 Justice Field declared that a
"great wrong" had been visited upon the "manufacturers of liquors."so
The majority believed they had "gone to the utmost verge of constitutional
authority[]" in upholding the state's regulation, but, in reality, "it ha[d] passed
beyond that verge, and crossed the line which separates regulation from
confiscation."5' To Justice Field, Kansas's law was another unjustifiable
encroachment upon the natural rights of citizens-here, the ability to pursue a
common calling free of state interference. 52
In Mugler, Justice Harlan's opinion provided the mechanics for economic due
process; Justice Field's dissent provided its rhetoric. Only one Justice in 1887 was
willing to identify economic liberty as inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, but
that would change over the next decade as the Court underwent a period of rapid
turnover in personnel.s" Crucially, two appointments went to Justices David J.

44 See LAN MILLHISER, INJUSTICES: THE SUPREME COURT'S HISTORY OF COMFORTING THE
COMFORTABLE AND AFFLICTING THE AFFLICTED 7-11 (2015) (discussing Field's extremist views);

Manuel Cachin, Justice Stephen Field and "FreeSoil, Free Labor Constitutionaism Reconsidering
Revisionism, 20 LAW &HIST. REV. 541, 564-76 (2002) (critically analyzing Field's jurisprudence in light
of favorable revisionist scholarship).
45

See JACK BEAyY, AGE OF BETRAYAL: THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY IN AMERICA, 1865-1900, at

153 (2007) (christening Field as "[t]he father of 'laissez-faire constitutionalism'").
46
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662 ("[T]he entire scheme of prohibition, as embodied in the constitution and
laws of Kansas, might fail, if the right of each citizen to manufacture intoxicating liquors for his own use
as a beverage were recognized. Such a right does not inhere in citizenship.").
47 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36,83 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
48 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting).
49 See BRIAN DOHERTY, RADICALS FOR CAPITALISM: A FREEWHEELING HISTORY OF THE
MODERN AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN MOVEMENT 28 (2007) ("Field was one of the pioneers of the

concept (beloved by many libertarian legal thinkers) of substantive due process-the notion that the due
process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment applied not merely to procedures but to the substance
of laws as well.").
so Mugler, 123 U.S. at 678 (Field, J., dissenting).
52 See John C. Eastman & Timothy Sandefur, Stephen Field: FrontierJustice or Justice
on the
Naturad Rights Frontier, 6 NEXUS 121, 123 (2001) (detailing Field's commitment to natural law
philosophy); BEATFY, supra note 45, at 149 ("Natural law furnished a lever to upend laws enacting the
fallible will of the people ... Field's opinions descend from 'right,' 'principles of morality,' and 'eternal
verity.'). For an explicit example of Field's natural rights-based jurisprudence, see Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96-97 (Field, J., dissenting) (explaining that the [Fourteenth] Amendment
"refers to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens").
S3 Between 1888 and 1895, Grover Cleveland and Benjamin Harrison made eight total appointments
to six different seats. See Owen M. Fiss, Fuller Court (1889-1910), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
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Brewer and Rufus W. Peckham-the "intellectual leaders" of the Fuller Court's
conservative hegemony5 4 and willing inheritors of Justice Field's unfinished work.s
Barely a year after Justice Peckham's nomination to the Court, and in the final term
ofJustice Field's career, an opportunity arose to finish the job.
On its face, Allgeyer v. Louisiana" appeared to be a simple case-one with little
chance of altering the constitutional landscape. Louisiana's legislature passed a
statute in 1894 that required marine insurance agencies not licensed in the state to
station an agent within Louisiana's borders if they wanted to contract with the state's
citizens." In practice, this placed a burden on Louisianans' abilities to contract with
most out-of-state agencies.5 Applying Mugler, the Court could have simply struck
down the statute and called it a day, economic protectionism alone would not have
satisfied Justice Harlan's requirement that a law protect the public's health, morals,
or safety. But Justice Peckham, writing for a unanimous Court, broadly read the
scope of "liberty" in the Due Process Clause to encompass a substantive, economic
element:
The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth] amendment means not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his
person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right
of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties[;] to be free to
use them in all lawful ways[;] to live and work where he will[;] to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling[;] to pursue any livelihood or avocation[;]
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary[,] and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the
purposes above mentioned."
He proceeded to link this newfound liberty to "the privilege of pursuing an
60
ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring, holding[,] and selling property" and then
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1164 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., Macmillan Reference

USA 2d ed. 2000) (1986).
54 Id. at 1164-65.
ss See CHARLES FAIRMAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 324 (Henry Holt & Co.
rev. ed. 1950) (1948) ("Peckham ... in upholding the new 'liberty of contract,' carried on where [Justice
write
Field] once led[.]"); MILLHISER, supra note 44, at 96 ("Peckham was the perfect justice to ...
Justice Field's conservative vision into the Constitution."). Brewer, it should be mentioned, was Field's
nephew. See BEATTY, supra note 45, at 157-58 ("The Slaughter-Housedissent staked out the ground
[Field] fought on for the rest of his twenty-three years on the Court, that his nephew, Justice David
Brewer, fought on, that a Fieldian Court fought on from the mid-1890s until the New Deal, and that a
new conservative Court may fight on into the twenty-first century: property over community.").
56 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
s7 Id. at 583.
5 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 178 (1991)
("'The legislature probably enacted the statute in Algeyer to protect in-state insurance companies from
out-of-state competitors.").
s' AlIgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
6
0 Id. at 591.
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invalidated the Louisiana statute for interfering with an individual's right to contract

'

"outside the state."6
If it feels like that profound declaration came out of nowhere, that is because it
mostly didcome out of nowhere. In barely four pages of writing, and relying on just
two holdings as precedent, 62 Justice Peckham appeared to fundamentally modify the
intertwined futures of due process jurisprudence and economic-based legislation.
Lochner's cave was now open to the masses.
B. Reign (1897-1934)
The Justices, however, had not scrapped Mugleis framework altogether. Just one
year after Allgeyerwas decided, the Supreme Court upheld a Utah law limiting the
number of working hours for miners in the case of Holden v. Hardy" While "the
police power cannot be put forward as an excuse for oppressive and unjust
legislation," the Court assured that it could limit economic due process when
"preserving the public health, safety, or morals[.]j6 Moreover, state legislatures still
possessed broad discretion in determining "not only what the interests of the public
require[d], but what measures [were] necessary for the protection of such interests."
So, what did Allgeyer really change? The Court made passing references to this
theory of "liberty of contract" in the years immediately following its inception, 66 but
what did it entail? To what extent did it reach? Few would disagree that a state had
a strong interest in maintaining the health and safety of its miners.6' What would
the Justices do with an issue that was not black and white?
Id. at 592-93.
See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Ongins of
FundamentalRightsConstitutionalism,92 GEO. L.J. 1, 44-45 (2003). Bernstein observes that Peckham's
holding in Algeyer is cobbled together exclusively from Harlan's dicta in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127
U.S. 678, 684 (1888), and a concurring opinion in Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock
Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock & Slaughterhouse Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J.,
concurring). Id. at 44. But, Harlan actually upheld state restrictions on the sale of margarine in Powell,
and the Butchers' Union concurrence generally denounced government-sponsored monopolies. Id. Even
combined, these opinions were "dubious authority for a broad right to liberty of contract." Id.
63 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898).
64
d. at 392.
6s Id. (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136
(1894)).
66 See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 351 (1904); Patterson v. Bark Eudora,
190 U.S.
169, 173-74 (1903); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 603 (1898); United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 572-73 (1898).
6 Note, however, that Holden was a 7-2 decision; Brewer and Peckham dissented without filing
opinions. SeeDAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 21 (2011) (observing the duos' tendency to silently dissent in cases
concerning state police power); MILLHISER, supra note 44, at 96. It is unclear if these Justices believed
that the employers' and employees' due process rights outweighed the legitimate safety concerns of the
state or that the concerns themselves were not legitimate. A more likely explanation is that they perceived
Utah's statute as a form of special-interest "class legislation." SeegenerallyMichael Les Benedict, LaissezFaire andLibenry: A Re-Evahiation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-FaireConstitutionaism, 3
LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 330 (1985) (concluding that the "heart" of laissez-faire constitutionalism "was
opposition to class and special legislation").
61
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The Lochner dragon arrived at the Court's footsteps in 1905. New York had
passed a law eight years prior that prohibited bakery employees from working more
than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week, which Joseph Lochner-a Uticabased bakery owner-challenged as an unconstitutional deprivation of his liberty to
contract with his workers." The Court, which had welcomed three new arrivals on
69
the bench since Allgeyer (among them Justice Holmes), was tasked with deciding
whether the New York statute was a reasonable exercise of its police power in the
70
or an excessive infringement of its citizens' freedom to "enter into
mold of Holen,
all contracts which may be proper, necessary[,] and essential."n
In a 5-4 decision, the late Justice Field was finally vindicated. 72 Justice Peckham,
writing again for the Court, invalidated the statute as an "unreasonable,
unnecessary[,] and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his
personal liberty."7 ' Specifically, he determined that New York's law was unnecessary
7
to protect the public health, 7 4 the bakers' health, or the imbalance in bargaining
7
power between bakery employers and employees. ' These assertions, of course,
become tenuous at best upon the slightest review of contemporaneous industry
standards.7 7 Regardless, Justice Peckham made a clear distinction between the bakers'
plight and the facts present in Holden- "[T]he trade of a baker ... is not an unhealthy
one to that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right
to labor, and with the right of free contract on the part of the individual[.]'"

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46, 52 (1905).
SeeFiss, supra note 53, at 1164.
70 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
71 See supra text accompanying note 59.
72 See MILLHISER, supranote 44, at 96 ("Six years after Field's death and just eight years after his
retirement from the bench, Lochner v. New York would be more than just a victory for Joseph Lochner,
it would be the culmination of Field's life's work.").
7 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
74 Id. at 57.
7 Id. at 59.
76 Id. at 57 ("There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to
men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care for
themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of judgment and
of action.").
7 Colby and Smith provide a summary of Progressives' many problems with Peckham's arguments.
Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 537-38. Indeed, many critics aver that the majority was "either
unconsciously oblivious or viciously hostile to the realities of the sweatshop-era workplace[.]" Id. at 537.
New York's bakers at the time often toiled in squalid working conditions, akin to "hot dungeons" lacking
proper ventilation, see MILLHISER, supra note 44, at 91-94, and the state legislature was well aware of
the potential health risks this posed to consumers. See Matthew S.R. Bewig, Laboringin the "Poisonous
Gases" Consumption,Publc Health, and the Lochner Court, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 476, 482 (2005).
Additionally, the number of hours worked was almost certainly a legitimate concern, as bakers in the
industrial era often worked in excess of one-hundred hours per week. Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York:
Tradition or Changein ConstitutionadLaw?,1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 404,407 (2005).
7 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
68
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A pair of dissents came from the Court's most famous figures. Justice Harlan was
inclined to uphold the statute under the rational-basis framework he set forth in
Mugler" In his view, because the "liberty of contract is subject to such regulations
as the State may reasonably prescribe for the common good and the well-being of
society," pro-active legislation should not "be disregarded or held invalid unless it be,
beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative power." In that spirit,
New York's law was clearly within the acceptable threshold, as "labor in excess of
sixty hours during a week in such establishments may endanger the health" of bakery
employees."'
Because Justice Harlan conceded that the Due Process Clause protected the
liberty of contract to some extent, Justice Holmes stood alone in insisting that the
clause contained no such economic component.8 2 His most famous remark in the
617-word dissent-"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics"-is unmistakable in its message: that Justice Peckham and
his corroborators were impermissibly reading their anti-regulatory, "survival of the
fittest" economic views into the provisional text." Hence, "a Constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism ... or of
laissezfaire." 4 To Justice Holmes, the word "liberty" becomes
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that[] a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people
and our law[."
Liberty of contract did not qualify as a fundamental right because economies had
been regulated and professions had been licensed since the beginning of time. As
Justice Holmes observed, the majority's notion of economic free will was
controverted by "ancient examples" of regulations like "[s]unday laws and usury
laws," and more contemporary examples like anti-lottery laws."
If Harlan wished to shackle the dragon, Holmes intended to slay it. But Justice
Peckham's opinion carried the day, and it transcended the next three decades of
constitutional law as the Court ossified as a "conservative bulwark against attempts
to expand the reach and authority of public institutions."" Under the liberty of
contract theory, the Justices struck down a litany of regulations that are now

See id. at 65-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
so Id. at 68.
s" Id. at 69.
82 Id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8 Id; see also VILLHISER, supna note 44, at 90-91, 111-12 (detailing Spencer Herbert's influence
7

on American intellectuals as well as a Wisconsin Supreme Court case invoking the liberty of contract).
84 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (alteration in
original).
s Id. at 76.
86

Id. at 75.

87

Hunter, supra note 33, at 37.
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commonplace today, doing so on the basis that they interfered with principles of
employee-employer negotiations, regardless ofwhatever balance in bargaining power
actually existed in the industry." Minimum wage laws were routinely scorched by
Lochner's inferno.8 9 Laws forbidding "yellow-dog" contracts-where a worker
agreed, as a condition of employment, to not be a member of a labor union-met a
similar fate.9 0 The Court upheld a limit on working hours for women, but it did so
under sexist logic, emphasizing the importance of child-rearing and the perils of
female physical inferiority in the workplace9 ' (wage floors for women, of course,
were roundly denied). It is of little coincidence that a majority ofJustices at this time
were interpreting the Commerce Clause on extremely narrow grounds, invalidating
92
Congress's attempts to regulate child labor practices and working conditions for
coal miners." The areas of law were doctrinally distinct, but the logic that steered
their conclusions was all too similar.94

C. Downfall and Defeat (1934-1955)

-

We know this period was not the permanent state of things. We know the dragon
was eventually confined. But when did it happen? How was it done? Contrary to the
conventional telling of events, which proffer that economic due process met an
5
immediate and unexpected death in the case of West CoastHotel Co. v Parish,
6
the Supreme Court signaled its end three years earlier in Nebbia v. New Yor?
but did not seal the cave until the 1950s.
In Nebbia, New York's legislature established a board that enacted maximum and
minimum prices for milk as a means of aiding destitute dairy farmers amidst the
nadir of the Great Depression.97 A grocer challenged the board's milk-pricing

88 See infra notes 322-325 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York errel.Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
9o See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
91 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908).
92 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
' See, e.g. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

94 See Paul Kens, The Source of a Myth: Polce Powers of the States and Laissez Faire

Constitutionalfsm, 1900-1937, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 70, 97-98 (1991) (arguing that, in spite of
revisionist efforts, laissez-faire jurisprudence still explains much of the "seemingly disparate decisions" of
the early twentieth century); Jedediah Purdy, Neohberal Constitutionalsm:Lochnerism for a New
Economy, 77 LAw &CONTEMP. PROBS. 195,203 (2014) (discussing the relationship between Lochnerera laissez-faire jurisprudence and a commitment to a federalist constitutional structure). Incredibly,
conservative judges were simultaneously reading the Sherman Antitrust Act so expansively as to apply it

to striking labor unions. See, e.g. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); William E. Forbath, The
Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1158-60, 1175-76, 1221-22
(1989).
9s 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
96 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
97 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 515-18.
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regulations as a violation of his due process under the liberty of contract to determine
his own prices." Justice Owen Roberts, the quintessential swing vote of his era,99
unexpectedly sided with the Court's liberal wing in upholding the regulations,"oo
handing Progressives a rare win during President Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term
in office. Justice Roberts wrote in language more familiar to the pre-AllgeyerCourt,
granting great deference to states "to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably
be deemed to promote public welfare."'' And with regard to the liberty of contract,
"[i]f the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process
are satisfied[.]" 102
Today, we recognize this doctrine as the rational basis test: the final distillation
of Justice Harlan's concoction in Mugler. The Court, perhaps realizing it had
prematurely de-fanged the dragon in Nebbia, continued this reversal in West Coast
Hotel by explicitly rejecting Justices Field's and Peckham's shared vision of the
Constitution.' 03 In West Coast Hotel, a chambermaid sued her employer for not
complying with Washington State's minimum wage law, placing Adkins v.
Children's Hospital up for review.' 4 The same five Justices that upheld the
regulations at issue in Nebbia and West CoastHotel vindicated the maid's claim,
holding that "the Adkins case was a departure from the true application of the
principles governing the regulation by the State of the relation of employer and
employed."105

.

The past era was called into question and summarily denounced: "This power.
. to restrict freedom of contract has had many illustrations. That it may be exercised
in the public interest with respect to contracts between employer and employee is
undeniable." 0 6 Moreover, "the legislature is entitled to its judgment" even if "the
wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain. "107
With the presumption ofvalidity now safely returned to the states' corner, Adkins
was explicitly overruled. Lochner, which the Adkins majority had relied upon in
striking down wage floors,'0o was overruled sub silentio.10' The Court, now singing
the New Deal's tune with full-throated approval, would codify the rational basis test
for economic legislation in the body of UnitedStates v. CaroleneProducts Co., while
forecasting liberal protections for substantive noneconomic rights in the opinion's
9

' Id. at 531.
9" See liLLHISER, supra note 44, at 152-57 (illustrating the impact of Roberts's role as the swing
vote and his reversal on various economic regulations in 1937).
100 See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537-39.
101 Id. at 537.
102 id
103 SeeW. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,395-400 (1937).
104 W CoastHotel, 300 U.S. at
386-90.
105 Id. at 397.
106 Id. at 392-93.
107 Id. at 399.
108 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545, 548-50.
' See W CoastHotel, 300 U.S. at 397-400.
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infamous fourth footnote."o Justice Hugo Black, looking back at the wreckage,
calcified his generation's distaste for the Lochner era in 1949 by referring to the
liberty of contract as a "due process philosophy that has been deliberately
discarded.""' But the final blow to the dragon's dominion-the metaphorical
dancing on Lochneis grave, so to speak-came in 1955. In Wiamson v. Lee
Optical, the Court stretched rational basis to its theoretical limit by upholding an
Oklahoma statute that permitted only licensed optometrists to fit lenses to faces or
replace the frames of glasses, despite the relative simplicity of the process:
[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to
be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it. The day is gone when this Court uses the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.112
Even though the statute "may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many
cases[,] ... it [was] for the legislature[s], not the courts, to balance the advantages
and disadvantages of the new requirement."
By shelving the liberty of contract for generations to come, Progressives won the
battle of the twentieth century. But recent developments in conservative
jurisprudence signal that the war over economic due process will be rekindled in the
new millennium.
II. RESURGENCE IN THE RANKS: THE DOCTRINE FINDS NEW DISCIPLES
The mainstream treatment of Lochnertoday is almost uniformly hostile, but it
differs sharply along ideological lines: conservatives decry the case for protecting
unenumerated rights, while liberals shun it for protecting the wrong unenumerated
rights. This shared hostility has ceded ground to libertarian intellectuals to re-shape
the narrative of Lochner and cultivate a new generation of advocates.

n United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 &n.4. (1938).
n Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535-37 (1949). This began
the process of a "Carthaginian [P]eace," by which Justices such as Black "ploughed salt into the fields of
Lochnerandmade its name anathema for decades." Purdy, supra note 94, at 209.
12 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
u1 Id. at 487. The Court offered several explanations as to why the state may have found the law
necessary, including the frequency with which lens-fitting appointments also necessitated optometrist
expertise in other eye-related issues. Id. While the statute did not require that a patient receive an eye
examination for each change or duplication of lenses, the potential "for detection of latent ailments or
diseases" during such appointments represented the "evil at hand for correction" that satisfied rational
basis review. Id. at 487-88.
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Colby and Smith have documented the evolution of Lochner as a staple in our
constitutional anti-canon.' 14 While Progressives generally practiced what they
preached upon gaining control of the Supreme Court in the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations, exercising the type of judicial deference to legislatures that figures
like Felix Frankfurter sermonized for decades,' a new generation of liberal
appointees assumed a more activist posture in enforcing their own ideals ofjustice." 6
The liberals of the Warren and Burger Courts embraced unenumerated rights in
Giswold v. Connecticu?"' and Roe v. Wade,"s the latter of which brought
substantive due process back to the bench in fill swing." 9 Contemporary theorists
criticized this development as a Lochnerian twist of hypocrisy,1 20 even levying that
"Lochner and Roe are twins," birthed from the same unholy marriage of judicial
activism and personal preferences.1 21 Modern liberals typically justify this expansion
in terms of the "living Constitution," which adapts to the evolving societal values of
the day,1 2 2 but a form of cognitive dissonance has existed within liberal legal theory
ever since.1 23

Meanwhile, modern conservative jurisprudence-essentially lost in the
wilderness for decades post- West CoastHotel-emerged mostly as a reaction to the
Warren Court's activism.124 Under the massively influential theory of originalism
spearheaded by Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia, the recognition of unenumerated
rights was seen as an unjustifiable deviation from the "original intent" of the
Constitution's Framers.1 25 As such, the type of judicial activism that generates
substantive due process is per se unconstitutional.1 26 While Roe and its "right of
privacy" were the bite noire of originalist converts, this generation of conservatives
was happy to denounce the Lochnerera as the earliest example of activist heresy.1 27
Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 541-79.
ns Id. at 543-44.
116 Id. at 549-50.
n. See generaily381 U.S. 479 (1965).
ns See generally410 U.S. 113 (1973).
n' See id. at 153 ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
120 See Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 555.
121 Ely, supranote 28, at 940.
122 Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 556-57.
123 See MILLHISER, supra note 44, at 208 ("Roe ...
placed liberals in the awkward position of
defending the very same unchecked approach to judging that left millions of workers virtually powerless
against exploitation by their employers[.]"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
778 (2d ed. 1988) (1978) (conceding that "[n]one of the theories offered to date is [sic] wholly satisfying"
regarding liberal defenses of unenumerated rights).
124 Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 558-60; see also MILLHISER, supra note 44, at 199-204
(chronicling the arc of Nixon's campaign against the Warren Court in calling for judicial restraint).
125 Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 565-67.
126 Id. at 560-61.
127 Id. at 560-63; see also MILLHISER, supra note 44, at 209-11 (discussing the Reagan
administration's hostility toward the concept of unenumerated rights).
114
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But a libertarian strand of conservatism had detached itself from the mainstream's
total rejection of substantive due process, even during the Reagan administration
where Bork and Scalia's views were ascendant.' 2 8 This undercurrent, first churned by
30
Richard Epsteinl2 9 and Bernard Siegan, has swelled into a river of scholarship in
recent years, channeling libertarian protections of property rights and free-market
interests into an activist blend of originalism. Through these efforts, there is hope
within the movement that the dragon will return to the world once more.
A. The Rehabilitationists
In the context of today's political environment, it is little wonder why the liberty
of contract remains attractive to twenty-first century libertarians: its
33
credentials make it a
anti-collectivist,"' anti-redistributive,1 3 2 and anti-regulatory

12 See Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 564-65.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

129

DOMAIN 112 (1985) ("The sole function of the police power is to protect individual liberty and private
property against all manifestations of force and fraud."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Toward a
Revitalzation ofthe ContractClause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703,734 (1984) ("Lochnermay well have given
too much scope to the police power, for it can be argued that there is no reason to interfere with freedom
of contract, even for reasons of health, where no third-party interests are at stake.").
130 See genrally BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIc LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(Transaction Publishers ed.-2006) (1980); Bernard H. Siegan, RehabiltatingLochner, 22 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 453, 496-97 (1985); SeegenerallyMoreover, Siegan's nomination to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1987 failed in part due to his "ardent libertarian views on economic matters," buttressed by his
belief "that the Constitution protected what he called the 'economic liberties' of individuals." Margalit
Fox, Bernard Siegan, 81, Legal Scholar and Reagan Nominee, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/01/us/01siegan.html [https://perma.cc/F7ZN-NVCJ].
131 SeeJanice Rogers Brown, Assoc. Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, Address to the Federalist Society
at the University of Chicago School of Law, "AWhiter Shade of Pale": Sense and Nonsense-The Pursuit
at
available
(transcript
20, 2000)
(Apr.
Politics
and
in
Law
of Perfection
http://communityrights.org/PDFs/4-20-OOFedSoc.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY45-WTCW]) (asserting
that the New Deal "inoculated the federal Constitution with a kind of underground collectivist
mentality").
132 See AMAR, supra note 9, at 274, 561 n.26 (arguing that, in spite of revisionist reasoning to the
contrary, the Lochner Court's "root objection" to Progressive laws was "that they were designed to
redistribute wealth from employers to laborers"); see alsoJames W. Ely, Jr., Rufus W Peckharn and
Economic Liberty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 591, 635 (2009) ("Peckham was hostile to what he perceived as
class legislation and schemes to redistribute wealth."); Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor,
Eldred and Lochner: Copyight Term Extension and IntellectualProperty as ConstitutionalProperty,
112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2392 (2003) ("The [Lochner] Court was ... both viewing the statute as a wealth
transfer and concluding that a statute that produced a wealth transfer, without benefitting society as a
whole, was unconstitutional, even if the legislature decided that legitimate reasons existed for aiding a
particular group."). These observations generally pull from the text of the opinion itself, where Peckham
castigated New York's statute as "a labor law, pure and simple." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57
(1905).
133 See Colby & Smith, supranote 30, at 568 ("[I]t is not surprising to find that many central figures
in the conservative legal movement went to great lengths to stress that their opposition to Lochnerwas a
matter of legal principle, as evidenced by the fact that they agreed in large part, as a matter of policy, with
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strong candidate to roll back the New Deal's excesses. Furthermore, the doctrine's
origins in natural rights philosophy allow it to seamlessly integrate with traditional
libertarian pedagogy.
To this point, the author has broadly referred to libertarian academics and
scholars bent on re-introducing economic due process to the country as Lochner
revisionists. But, a more apt label for this group would be "Rehabilitationists."1 34 A
revisionist wishes to correct the record, but a Rehabilitationist has an agenda. And
these scholars are not merely attempting to flip the script of a long-dead case as a
matter of exacting historical accuracy- the Rehabilitationists want to make Lochner
more attractive for future use.
One such Rehabilitationist is David Bernstein, the leading authority on the
Lochner case among this "new wave of libertarian scholars."' Bernstein's 2011
book, RehabiltatingLochner,13 6 is the culmination of a career's worth of scholarship
relating to the liberty of contract doctrine. 3 7
Specifically, in building upon previous revisionist efforts and adding to the
record, Bernstein sought to offer a modernized account of the Lochnercase and the
era of economic liberty more generally as an effort to correct the various myths that
have "unfairly maligned" economic due process jurisprudence."' And on the simple
matter of fact-checking, Bernstein is roundly successful.
First, some evidence exists to question the New York legislature's motives in
passing the bakery law at issue in Lochner. While the traditional account of the case
positions the state as a benevolent entity acting on behalf of the health and safety of
vulnerable employees,' 9 and thus surpassing the hurdles on economic liberty set in
Holden,"4 Bernstein frames the statute as a rent-seeking sham, surreptitiously
enacted on behalf of large-scale bakeries and New York's xenophobic bakers' union
that supported the legislation to curb competition from immigrant-run shops.141
Lochneis antiregulatory impulse."); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The UnregulatedOffensive, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Apr. 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/17/magazine/the-unregulated-offensive.html
[https://perma.cc/YZG7-33FJ]
(articulating the present day evolution of the Constitution in Exile movement).
134
Brian Beutler,
The Rehabiltationists, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug.
30, 2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-movement-undo-new-deal
[https://perma.cc/RBL2-4FJ6].
13s Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 569-70.
136 See BERNSTEIN, supra note
67.
137 Most of Bernstein's scholarship either eponymously invokes Lochner or at least implicates
economic
liberty.
See
David
E.
Bernstein,
Cuniculum
Vitae,
https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/faculty/cv/bernstein.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UTQ-CFQX] (last
visited Feb. 3, 2018).
us BERNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 125.
139 See id at 23.
14 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
141 BERNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 23. But see Kens, supra note 77, at 409 n.19 ("Those who claim
that a conspiracy of unions and large bakeries produced the Bakeshop Act provide no primary support.");
Paul Kens, Kenson Bernstein, 'RehabiltatingLochner:DefendingIndividualRightsAgainstProgressive
Reform,' H-LAW (June 2013), https://networks.h-net.org/node/16794/reviews/17301/kens-bemsteinrehabilitating-lochner-defending-individual-rights [https://perma.cc/WM5E-DPLN] (reiterating that
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This version of the story re-casts the Lochner majority as heroes, weeding out the
type of paternalist and protectionist legislation that typified the Progressive era in a
crusade to preserve individual liberty. It also shades Justice Holmes in a villainous
light, lambasting his caustic dismissal of the majority's analysis and accusation of
laissez-faire influence as being "beyond the pale."142 Au contraire, says Bernstein:
Lochner-and the liberty of contract more generally-was based on a long tradition
of natural rights jurisprudence embedded in the Founders' understanding of liberty
and property rights,' 4 3 as well as persistent judicial hostility at the time to laws
perceived as "class legislation."1" Therefore, Justice Peckham was not crudely forcing
his "particular economic theory"1 45 upon the nation; he was evaluating and applying
46
a plausible reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.1
In addition to rehabbing Lochner's image, Bernstein defends the men behind the
147
In
movement, from Field to Peckham to the Four Horsemen of the New Deal.
combatting the traditional narrative adopted from the "sociological jurisprudence"
school of Progressive intellectuals, which barraged the liberty of contract and its
practitioners with a flurry of pro-labor, hyper-majoritarian rhetoric throughout the
early twentieth century,1 48 Bernstein argues that these conservative Justices were not
nearly as activist as history portrays them to be-in fact, the Supreme Court upheld
many more economic regulations than it invalidated between Allgeyer and West
Coast Hotel.149 Moreover, the Court intervened in cases that modern liberals and
civil rights advocates would normally celebrate, as it occasionally invoked the liberty
of contract to protect the rights of women workersso and African American property
owners.'' Finally, Bernstein combats the Lochner dragon by denying its very
existence. While Progressive lawyers and politicians criticized the case in the years

despite Bernstein's depiction of events, New York's bakers unions were in fact "politically powerless"). See
also Ian Millhiser, The Most Incompetent Brnch, 23 GEO. MASON L. REv. 507, 511-12 (2016)
(echoing Kens's argument in response to similar speculation). Indeed, the idea that a late-nineteenthcentury bakers' union possessed and wielded great influence over a major state legislature should be enough
to give anyone pause.
142 BERNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 35-37.

Id. at 17-20.
'" Id at 14-16.
143

145 See supra text accompanying note 84 (highlighting Justice Holmes's sentiments toward the
interaction between the Constitution and economic theories).
146 See David Bernstein, Amar on Lochner, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 12, 2012, 3:04 PM),
http://volokh.com/2012/09/12/amar-on-lochner/ [https://perma.cc/YN9K-B9HF].
147 See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 67 (favoring those who have advocated for limited
government throughout history while tracing Lochner's influence on modern constitutional
jurisprudence).
148

Id. at 40-44.
.

149 Id. at 120-21 ("[T]he Supreme Court had upheld the vast majority of laws that came before it,
allowing significant, though not unlimited, room for the regulatory state's growth. .
`so Id. at 56-72.

1s1 Id. at 73-89.
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following its birth,152 it was hardly the era-defining tyrant it is treated as today.
Indeed, Lochner was rarely viewed as unique from its liberty of contract brethren,
and the majority in West Coast Hotel did not even bother to expressly overrule
Lochner when the time came for its doctrine's defeat.'s Rather, Lochner's
demonization emerged as a convenient shorthand for Progressive intellectuals and
their liberal heirs,'15 4 who gravitated to Justice Holmes's (flawed) dissent to champion
his brand of judicial restraint as emblematic of how judges should carry themselves
in reviewing economic legislation.ss
Of course, Bernstein cushions his revisionism by insisting that he does not "take
any position in the book as to the correctness of Lochnerbeyond implicitly arguing
that it was a plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment when it was
decided[,]"s 6 and that he "draws no normative conclusions about current
constitutional practice.'s7
This suggests an incredible feat of devil's advocacy. Bernstein has authored over
a dozen revisionist articles pertaining to Lochner specifically and economic rights
more generally.s 8 As Akhil Reed Amar has quipped, "The title 'Rehabilitating
Lochner' is a quite misleading one" if all Bernstein meant to say was that "Lochner,
though wrongly decided, was part of a series of cases not all of which are terrible."'5 9
In reality, "The title rather dearly implies the correctness of Lochner."'
152 For prominent examples, see Edward S. Corwin, The DoctrineofDue ProcessofLawBefore the
Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 366-68 (1911); Ernst Freund, Limitation ofHours ofLaborand the
FederalSupreme Court, 17 GREEN BAG 411, 414-16 (1905); Learned Hand, Due Process ofLaw and
the Eight-HourDay, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495, 502-03 (1908); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18
YALE L.J. 454, 479-81 (1909). Outside the realm of scholarly critique, Theodore Roosevelt may have
been the most vocal in his disdain for the Lochner decision. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two
Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of FundamentalRights, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 751, 779-84 (2009).
153 Perhaps as a show of consensus for Bernstein's historicism, this argument has become increasingly
commonplace among those to his left. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 33, at 37 ("[Lochne] was rarely cited
in subsequent cases, and ultimately set aside without acknowledgement or fanfare.").
154 BERNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 113-18.

ISs Id. at

45-46.

156 Bernstein, supra note
1 7

146.

5 David E. Bernstein, A Reply to ProfessorGeorge W Licbmanni Review ofREHABILITATING
LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM, 21 LAW & POL.

BOOK REV.
424, 424 (2011), http://www.lawcourts.org/LPBR/reviews/bernstein0711r.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y7T2-HB65]. Presumably, this is to preserve Bernstein's book as an academic and
historical work and distance itself from the sort of outright advocacy adopted by other Lochner-friendly
polemics that have been released this decade. See generally CLARK M. NEILY, III, TERMS OF
ENGAGEMENT: How OUR COURTS SHOULD ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION'S PROMISE OF
LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2013); DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A
LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2011); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING:
ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW (2010).
15 SeeBernstein, supra note 137.

' Akhil Reed Amar, A Too-QuickResponse toDavidandllya,VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 13,
2012,
8:08
AM),
http://volokh.com/2012/09/13/a-too-quick-response-to-david-and-ilya/
[https://perma.cc/WZ2B-FPFWJ.
16o Id. Moreover, Bernstein is implying that he only cares to defend the reasoning of Lochner (and
not its result). If that were the case, why not name the book "RehabiltatingPeckham"?
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But what Bernstein will not commit to, Randy Barnett will proudly say. Barnett,
a "rock-star" of the legal right, 6 ' has done more than anyone this century to bring
Epstein and Siegan's libertarian rebellion to the forefront of conservative
jurisprudence. 1 6 2 Barnett earned his reputation as the "intellectual godfather of the
6
argument that the [Affordable Care Act] is unconstitutional"' ' by framing the legal
1 64
challenge in terms of individual liberty rather than on federalism grounds,
invigorating the Tea Party movement's resistance to healthcare reform6's and in turn
66
making him "a hero to the conservative legal establishment."1 This episode was
consistent with Barnett's career, as he has explicitly advocated for a return of the
6
liberty of contract and an embrace of unenumerated rights. 1
Indeed, "Barnett believes the Constitution exists to secure inalienable property
68
and contract rights for individuals."' This break with Borkian conservatives is not
merely cosmetic; it carries an incalculable economic impact if five Justices were to
ever adopt Barnett's reading.169 Under this vision, modern social welfare laws-wage
floors, overtime provisions, worker safety regulations, bans on yellow-dog contracts,
and other government interventions that we frequently take for granted-are likely

161 Garrett Epps, Reagans Court vs. the Libertarians, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/reagans-court-v-libertarians [https://perma.cc/Z7HN-RXMZ].
162 See Beutler, supra note 134.
163 Kate Zernike, ProposedAmendment Would Enable States to Repeal FederalLaw, N.Y. TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/us/politics/20states.html?_r=0
2010),
19,
(Dec.
[https://perma.cc/R4UW-5Q4J].
164 See Randy Barnett, Opinion, Randy Barnett- We Lost on Health Care. But the Constitution
Won., WASH. POST (June 29, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/randy-barnett-welost-on-health-care-but-the-constitution-

won/2012/06/29/gJQAzJuJCW-story.htmlutm term=.5071b44bdald [https://perma.cc/8W22-B8UJ]
("Granting Congress this power would gravely limit the liberties of the people."); Randy E. Barnett,
Obamacares IndividualMandate Is a Dangerous New Federa Power, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 15,
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obamacares-individual-mandate-is-aAM),
12:00
2011,
dangerous-new-federal-power/article/39119 [https://perma.cc/Q8NV-ZTR9] (arguing that "[e]conomic
mandates are an unnecessary and improper means to the regulation of interstate commerce" because they
encapsulate "a power to conscript Americans to enter into contracts with private companies").
56 See Randy Barnett, The Tea Party, the Constitution, and the RepealAmendment, 105 Nw. U.
(2011),
282
281,
COLLOQUY
REv.
L.
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestem.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=nulr-online

[https://perma.cc/XR6P-FB9B].

16' Beutler,

supra note 134.
167 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 211-14, 319-33 (2004); see also Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution ProtectEconomic
Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 5, 5 (2012) ("The evidence that the Constitution protects rights
of private property and contract is overwhelming."). Note, however, that Barnett would recognize
economic liberty under the dormant Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than through substantive due process. See Barnett, supra note 24, at 333 ("Reverse SlaughterHouse and the 'evils' of Lochnerwould simply melt away....").
.6s Beutler, supranote 134.
169

o
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unconstitutional at the federal level.' Some one hundred years later, Barnett the
Advocate is nothing less than Peckham the Justice resuscitated, summoning the
dragon from its dwelling.
Bernstein's inquisitiveness and Barnett's militancy would remain radical

sentiments under Bork and Scalia's gospel ofjudicial restraint,"' muted to the masses
as mere rebel yells in the night, but Colby and Smith argue that originalism has
steadily honed an activist edge over the last decade.' 72 They offer two reasons for this
groundswell in libertarian influence.' The first factor is "generational," the simple
passage of time.174 Roe v. Wade was decided over forty years ago, and the last
generation of originalists rose to prominence free of the Warren Court menace.1 7s
Instead, these advocates came of age in an era of a conservative-dominated Court,
and their evolution closely resembles the period in which liberals shed their mantra
of New Deal-era restraint for a more activist blend of jurisprudence' 7 ' The fiercest
legal battles of recent years have certainly cultivated an activist sentiment among
conservatives, including landmark decisions regarding campaign spending, 7 7 gun
control,' 7 8 and healthcare legislation. 7 9

This gives way to the second factor: the theoretical maturity of originalism from
emphasizing the "original intent" of the Framers to the "original meaning" of the
Constitution's text.'s These "new originalists," as Colby and Smith broadly label

them, treat originalism as an interpretative theory of textual meaning rather than a
18
normative theory of adjudication;s
as such, they have conceded that the
Constitution's text is "objecdvely vague and abstract," and thus are more willing to
"vest[] judges with a great deal of interpretive discretion."'8 This results in "a much

7

1 1 Id.
172 Colby & Smith, supr note 30, at 588.

id.
Id. at 588-90.
175 Id. at 588.
176 Id at 588-89; see also Keith E. Whittington, The New Oiginalsm, 2 GEO. L.J.
&PUB. POL'Y
599, 609 (2004) (observing the "loosening of the connection between originalism and judicial deference
to legislative majorities.").
"' See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
178 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
' See NFIB v. Sebeius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
180 Colby & Smith, supranote 30, at 591 (original emphasis omitted); see Antonin Scalia, CommonLaw Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
ConstitutionandLaws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3,38
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (explaining that originalists are increasingly seeking "the original meaning of
173

174

the text, not what the original draftsmen intended"); BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF

ONE 244 (2014) (detailing Scalia's break from Bork's school of "original intent"-based originalism).
Somewhat helpfully, historian Jonathan Gienapp refers to this bifurcation between original intent and
public meaning as "Originalism 1.0" and "Originalism 2.0." See Jonathan Gienapp, Constitutional
Oiginalism and History, PROCESS: A BLOG FOR AM. HIST. (Mar. 20, 2017),
http://www.processhistory.org/originalism-history/ [https://perma.cc/9K6Y-9TDH].
'1 Colby & Smith, suprd note 30, at 592.
182 Id. (alteration in original).
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dearer path to resuscitating Lochner," as new originalism allows for a broader
interpretative scope than its previous "focus on the narrow intentions and
expectations of the Framers," which categorically denied the existence of
unenumerated rights. 1 3 "If the proper interpretative quest is for the objective
meaning" that a reasonable observer would find in the Constitution's text at the time
84
of its enactment, then such an embargo mustfail.' Indeed, a reasonable observer in
the nineteenth century may very well have reached the same conclusion as Barnett
regarding the Constitution's implicit protections of economic rights. The Ninth
5
Amendment itself contemplates extra-textual liberties.s
Ironically, no lawyer may be more responsible for the return of judicial activism
to the right than the man most committed to extinguishing it: Chief Justice John
Roberts.1 16 Whereas mainstream conservatives once celebrated his elevation to the
7
"Who is John
Court, Barnett cast a skeptical eye upon Roberts's coronation.'
8
Roberts?" Barnett asked in 2005, "[w]e know nothing about what he stands for."'
89
When the Chief failed to invalidate the Affordable Care Act on multiple occasions'
90
and subsequently enraged the conservative establishment,1 Barnett responded with
a call to arms. "[S]electing judges with the judicial mindset of 'judicial restraint' and
'deference' to the majoritarian branches leads to the results we witnessed in NFIB
and KIng," he warned.19 ' "[I]f conservative Republicans want a different performance
from the judiciary in the future, they must vet their presidential candidates to see
whether they understand this point."192

1

3

184
.ss

Id. at 593.

d
U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be

construed to deny or disparage othen retainedbythe people.") (emphasis added).
Seegencraly ConinnationHearingon the NominationofJohn G. Roberts,Jr. to be ChiefJustice
...
of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement
of John Roberts) ("Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them."); see also
Damon Root, HowJudicialRestraint ShapedJohn Roberts'[sic] ObamaCareDecision, REASONCOM
(June 29, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://reason.com/archives/2012/06/29/how-judicial-restraint-shaped-johnrober [https://perma.cc/6767-F7WL].
187 Beuder, supranote 134.
1ss See id.; Randy Barnett, Who isJohn Roberts? Who Knows, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 20,
1:07

2005,

PM),

http://volokh.com/2005/07/20/who-is-john-roberts-who-knows/

[https://perma.cc/U5PV-W6KV].
1s9 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
190 See, e.g., The Editors, Roberts Gets It Wrong Again, NAT'L REV.
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420310/roberts-gets-it-wrong-again-editors

(June 25, 2015),

[https://perma.cc/4MY8-GH88].

191 Randy Barnett, The Definition oflnsanity: Jeb Bush Still Favors Appointing Judges "with a
Proven Record of Judicial Restraint," WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 27, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/27/jeb-bush-still-favorsappointing-judges-with-a-proven-record-of-judicial-restraint/?utm term=.f69c9b78ec35
[https://perma.cc/W5CH-ATBT].
192

d
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Barnett's message is clear. The Court needs less John Robertses in its chambers
and more Rufus Peckhams.
B. The Converts
So far, we have discussed the Rehabilitationists' influence in a mostly academic
sense. With all due respect to this medium, economic due process will never complete
its comeback if it is confined to avant-garde law review articles or second-rate
treatment on the Federalist Society's speaking circuit. But, Barnett's and Bernstein's
efforts have proven fruitfil this decade in winning over several prominent advocates
that can solidify the liberty of contract's place in mainstream constitutional discourse.
While many members of the judiciary likely harbor reservations towards the postWiliamson level of deference afforded to economic legislation, only recently have
judges displayed the confidence to treat the rational basis test with outward,
Lochner-driven hostility. Consider the recently retired Judge Janice Rogers Brown
of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, a former Supreme Court short-lister during
the George W. Bush administration... and a controversial figure amongst the legal
establishment.19" It is not particularly surprising that Judge Brown was the one to fire
the first salvo, given that she has praised Lochner in a speech and concomitantly
described the New Deal as the "triumph of our own socialist revolution,"' but the
tone of her opinion in Hettinga v. UnitedStatesl96 is still jarring. Judge Brown wrote
that the milk regulation at issue in Hettinga, which her court upheld under rational
basis review, "reveals an ugly truth: America's cowboy capitalism was long ago
disarmed by a democratic process increasingly dominated by powerful groups with
economic interests antithetical to competitors and consumers."' 97 The courts, she
added, "[H]ave been negotiating the terms of surrender since the 1930s," and the
Supreme Court in particular has "abdicated its constitutional duty to protect
economic rights completely.""' She further called into question the entire postDepression economic order, including modern welfare programs and the regulatory

193

Marc Kaufman, Possible Nominees to the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (July 1, 2005, 11:12

AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070100756.html
[https://perma.cc/G2Z9-YNCG].
194 See David D. Kirkpatrick, New Judge Sees Slavery in Liberasm, N.Y. TIMES (June
9, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/09/politics/new-judge-sees-slavery-in-liberalism.html
[https://perma.cc/C8UY-8TSZ]; Jeffrey Rosen, Second Opinions, NEw REPUBLIC (May 4, 2012),
https://newrepublic.com/article/103090/conservative-judges-justices-supreme-court-obama
[https://perma.cc/EX7Y-NV8L].
19s Brown, supra note 131.
196 677 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
197 Id. at 480 (Brown,J., concurring). For a different perspective on the realities of cowboy economics,
see Mark
A.
Lause,
The
Cowboy Class Wars, JACOBIN (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/08/cowboys-wild-west-manifest-destiny-expansion/
[https://perma.cc/4KSC-R22B].
198 Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 480-81.
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state." Judge Brown glowingly cited Barnett and one of the Four Horsemen's
dissents in Nebbia before concluding her opinion on a dire note: "Rational basis
review means property is at the mercy of the pillagers. The constitutional guarantee
of liberty deserves more respect-a lot more. 200
Without exaggeration, this was a spirited call for the return of Lochner from a
judge sitting on what is perceived to be the second most powerful court in the
country, 201 and it was done so in the most unabashedly libertarian rhetoric since
Justice Peckham warmed a seat.
Recent support from the judiciary has been more nuanced, but also more
influential. Judge Don Willet of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (and former
Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas) is famous on many fronts, known for both
his large following on social media and his inclusion on President Donald Trump's
short list for nomination to the Supreme Court of the United States.2 0 2 In 2015,
Willett expressed his support for Lochner in a series of footnotes to a case in which
203
he invalidated an occupational licensing law for failing rational basis review. On
the same day that ChiefJustice Roberts read his dissent from the bench in Obergefell
v. Hodges,20 4 in which the Chief rhetorically tied the majority's recognition of a
fundamental right to marriage for same-sex couples to the judicial activism of the
Lochner era,20 5 thereby evincing the mainstream conservative treatment of
substantive due process, Willett excoriated "[t]he Lochner bogeyman [a]s a
mirage."206 Willett espoused the major themes of the Rehabilitationist movementthe relative infrequency of legislative invalidation before the New Deal, the
extremism of Justice Holmes's dissent, and the existence of economic due process
cases that pre-dated Lochner-and cited Bernstein's Rehabiltating Lochner as

more"
199 Id. at 481 ("[T]he Constitution created the countermajoritarian difficulty in order to thwart
potent threats to the Republic: the political temptation to exploit the public appetite for other people's
money-either by buying consent with broad-based entitlements or selling subsidies, licensing
restrictions, tariffs, or price fixing regimes to benefit narrow special interests.") (original emphasis
omitted).
200

Id. at 481-83.

201 See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Obama, Dems Make Mark on Second Most Powerful Court, USA
9

TODAY (Dec. 9, 2013, 2:22 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/12/0 /dcappeals-court-obama-senate/3909961/ [https://perma.cc/CA4T-PRLU].
202 Brandi Grissom, Justice Don Willett, the Boy from Taity, Takes Twitter by Stonn, and Maybe

Too,

SCOTUS,

(May

NEWS

DALLAS

2016),

20,

http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2016/05/20/justice-don-willett-the-boy-from-talty-takestwitter-by-storm-and-maybe-scotus-too [https://perma.cc/5RUE-WJHK].
203 Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015); see, e.g., id. at 94
n.11, 97 n.33.

204 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, CJ., dissenting); Ariane de Vogue, Roberts Issues Stern

Dissent

in

Same-Sex

Manage

Case,

CNN

(June

26,

2015,

http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/26/politics/john-roberts-gay-marriage-dissent/index.html
[https://perma.cc/83F5-27HU].
205
206

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 2617-18, 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 94 n.11.
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persuasive authority. 207 Even more revealing is Willett's citation of Colby and Smith's
article, for it demonstrates Willett's awareness of his place within a growing
movement:
A wealth of contemporary legal scholarship is reexamining Lochner, its
history and correctness as a matter of constitutional law, and its place
within broader originalist thought, specifically judicial protection of
unenumerated rights such as economic liberty. Long story short: Legal
orthodoxy about Lochner is evolving among many leading constitutional
208
theorists.

Activist arguments have also found a home among prominent members of the
commentariat. George Will, a Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist for the Washington
Post and a "leading conservative voice for decades,"2 09 once preached the standard
sermon in reverence of judicial restraint210 but reversed course upon reading and
reviewing Bernstein's book 2 1 1 In fact, Will now believes that "the court correctly
decided Lochner v. New York," and he is convinced that reviving the liberty of
contract would provide "another step in the disarmament" of regulatory
government. 2 1 2 "Many judges, . . . in practicing what conservatives have unwisely
celebrated as 'judicial restraint,' have subordinated liberty to majority rule," Will
Id. at 99 n.46.
Id. at 101 n.46 (citing BERNSTEIN, supranote 67; Colby & Smith, supranote 30). For
a fawning,
front-page profile of Willett and his embrace of Lochnerrevisionism, see Alan Greenblatt, Don Willett's
Lone Star Legal Show, GOVERNING (Aug. 2017), http://www.goveming.com/topics/public-justicesafety/gov-don-willett-conservative-justice.html
[https://perma.cc/FB9B-RS72]. For a scathing
depiction from across the aisle, see Ian Millhiser, The RadicalIdeologyof This Trump Nominee Makes
Even the Most Conservative SCOTUSJustices Uneasy, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://thinkprogress.org/trumps-most-radical-nominee-since-neil-gorsuch-02dlbcabc8e0/
[https://perma.cc/NG7D-WZDP].
209 Conservative Writer George Will Drops out of GOP over Trump, AP (June 26, 2016, 9:32 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/5cab8abbbdcf4d868ea38f02abcdd7ed/conservative-writer-george-willdrops-out-gop-over-trump [https://perma.cc/EW7T-KS9V].
210 See, e.g., George Will, How Irksome that We Allowfudges to Make Our Laws, SUNSENTINEL
(June
2, 1996), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1996-06-02/news/9606030105_1_punitive-awards-dueprocess-punitive-damages [https://perma.cc/4YYQ-Z9W8] ("In 1914, early in a career that established
him as America's greatest jurist never elevated to the Supreme Court, Learned Hand, a believer in
democracy and hence in judicial restraint, denounced judicial activism by conservative judges who used
the Constitution's guarantee of 'due process of law' to overturn laws that regulated economic transactions.
This was 'substantive due process,' the tendentious doctrine that many government actions distasteful to
judges can be baldly declared to be the results of constitutionally impermissible processes."). Cf
BERNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 44 (exemplifying Lochnerrevisionists' modern treatment ofJudge Hand).
21 George F. Will, Opinion, Why Liberals Fear the 'Lochner'Decision,WASH. POST (Sept. 7,
2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-liberals-fear-the-lochnerdecision/2011/09/06/gIQAZapUAK-story.htmlutm_term=.c2b8flcfef5c
[https://penna.cc/76UJN3L3]. This reversal is consistent with Will's ideological shift to economic libertarianism. See Nick
Gillespie & Matt Welch, George Wills Libertarian Evolution, REASON (Dec. 2013),
http://reason.com/archives/2013/11/13/george-wills-libertarian-evolu [https://perma.cc/WR37-PPN9].
207

208

212 Will, supra note 211.
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2 13
laments, which "serves liberalism by leaving government's growth unrestrained."
Following his newfound dogma to its logical conclusion, Will has answered Barnett's
battle cry by posing a litmus test of his own: "The next Republican president should
ask this of potential court nominees: Do you agree that Lochner correctly reflected
the U.S. natural rights tradition and the Ninth and 14th amendments' affirmation
of unenumerated rights?"21 4 This, presumably, would prevent another John Roberts
from donning a robe.
Finally, the Rehabilitationists found their most powerful ally in an elected
official who was always destined for the cause. Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky,
21 5
referred to
perhaps the most libertarian member of the United States Senate,
Lochner as a "wonderful decision" during a speaking filibuster in 2013, specifically
216
praising its expansion of unenumerated rights. In lockstep with Justice Field, Paul
believes such rights to be "unlimited" because "[y]ou got them from your Creator.
These are natural-born rights, and no democracy should be able to take these away
from you."21 7 Unsurprisingly, Paul cited Barnett's and Bernstein's works as major
influences.2 18 "I'm a judicial activist when it comes to Lochner," Paul later admitted
in a 2015 speech. 219 "Ifyou're for judicial restraint, what happens when the legislature
does bad things?"22 0
A pattern has dearly emerged. Bernstein's synthesis of revisionist scholarship has
provided the means by which anti-regulatory advocates may adopt judicial activism
as their creed, and Barnett provides the persuasion to unleash the dragon from its
cave. With momentum on their side, there is every reason to believe the
Rehabilitationist movement will continue to earn converts from the legal and
political right.

2 13

George F. Will, Opinion, George Will:JudicialActivismIsn't a Bad Thing, WASH. POST (an.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-judicial-activism-isnt-a-bad2014),
22,
thing/2014/01/22/31b41al2-82c7-11e3-8099-9181471f7aaf story.htmlhutm-term=.0f269524d834
[https://perma.cc/ABH2-KLX8].
214 George F. Will, Opinion, The 110 Year-Old Case that Still Inspires Supreme Court Debates,
WASH. POST (July 10, 2015,8:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/110-years-and-stillgoing-strong/2015/07/10/f3ObfelO-2662-11e5-aae2-6c4f59b050aa-story.html
[https://perma.cc/UL7A-EVGF].
215 See David Boaz, Is Rand Paul a Real Libertarian?, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 6, 2015, 3:52 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/rand-paul-real-libertarian-319959 [https://perma.cc/R99A-67XE].
216 159 CONG. REC. S1161 (daily ed. Mar. 6,2013) (statement of Sen. Rand Paul).
217
218

id

d

219 Andrew Prokop, The Supreme Courts Infamous Lochner Ers'Endedin the 1930s. Rand Paul

Wants It Back, Vox (Jan. 17, 2015, 10:10 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/1/17/7628543/rand-paullochner
[https://perma.cc/C99F-KH8B].
2 20
id
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III. EARLY BATTLES: LICENSING LAWS As LOCHNER'S TROJAN HORSE

One could argue that any talk of reviving Lochner is, at this point, purely
hypothetical, and mostly consists of liberal handwringing. None of the Justices on

the Supreme Court subscribe to a theory of economic liberty that is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, 221' and the modus operandi of conservative credence
remains judicial restraint.222 What, then, is the existential threat?
In this Part, the author argues the anti-protectionist decisions that have bubbled
beneath the Court's surface are a sort of low-calorie Lochner, willing to restore
heightened scrutiny to economic legislation. Admittedly, this concept of "rational
basis with [a] bite" is not novel,22 3 nor is the suspicion that lower courts are
channeling Lochner.22 4 While previous observations have focused on lower courts'
role in this jurisprudential shift, this author examines the actors behind the scene.
With little variation, the legal challenges to these statutes are led by libertarianminded lawyers that have a greater goal in mind than the invalidation of individual
rent-seeking legislation; they want to bring Barnett's and Bernstein's work to
completion from the ground up. These foot soldiers represent the "young[]
generation of elite conservative lawyers" that can change the composition of the

221 The radicalism of the Rehabilitationists' views, at least in the eyes of the modem Supreme Court,
can be demonstrated through the jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas, often
considered to be the most conservative justice on the Court today, almost certainly disagrees with the legal
framework of the modem regulatory state that emerged as a result of Progressives' expansive reading of
the Commerce Clause. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 58 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("Commerce, or trade, stood in contrast to productive activities like manufacturing or agriculture.");
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he very notion of a
'substantial effects' test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of
Congress' powers and with this Court's early Commerce Clause cases."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he term 'commerce' was used in contradistinction to
productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture."). But, Justice Thomas has ardently rejected
the doctrine of substantive due process. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 249 (2012)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is not a secret repository
of substantive guarantees against unfairness.") (internal quotation marks omitted). As previously
demonstrated, both concepts-the general distaste for government intervention and the receptiveness for
the activist shift in conservative jurisprudence-must be wed to truly rehabilitate Lochner. See supra notes
171-192 and accompanying text.
222
See, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, The Freewheeln'GeorgeWill, NAT'L REV.: BENCH MEMOS (July
13, 2015, 12:45 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/421102/freewheelin-george-willmatthew-j-franck [https://perma.cc/BHY9-BU37] (stating "there is not a 'no rent-seeking' provision in
the Constitution," and that "[w]ho says yes to Locbnercannotsay no to Obergefef).
223 Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 1066-67. See generallyGerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) ("Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the
Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagination."); see also Austin
Raynor, Note, EconomicLibertyandthe Second-OrderRationalBasis Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1072
(2013) (articulating the concept as "a more exacting conception of legitimate governmental interests and
a more stringent tailoring inquiry").
224 See, e.g., Brianne J. Gorod, Note, Does Lochner Live?: The DisturbingmplcationofCraigmiles
v. Giles, 21 YALE L. &POL'Y REV. 537, 538 (2003).
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bit, case by case.

two,"

2 25
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and release the dragon from its cave bit by

A. When the ReactionariesAre Reasonable
In the wake of the New Deal, the Supreme Court afforded almost unlimited
deference to states to regulate their occupational markets. 2 2 6 In 1963, it entrenched
itself even further by upholding a Kansas law that limited the profession of debtadjusting to lawyers. 227 This case, Ferguson v. Skrupa, was aimed directly at
22
overturning one of the Lochner-era's most reviled decisions, Adams v. Tanner,
which had invalidated a state law prohibiting private employment agencies from
charging upfront fees to people seeking work.229 Even though this industry was baldly
predatory, levying immediate costs on penniless workers that were desperate for
work, the Court in Adams held that while such agencies were subject to regulation,
the state could not flat-out prohibit its employees from following a "distinctly useful
calling."230 Ferguson gutted the last vestiges of natural rights-based economic due
process by declaring that the Court was no longer "willing to draw lines by calling a
law 'prohibitory' or 'regulatory. '"231
Wiliamson's and Ferguson'sbrand of hyper-deferential jurisprudence remained
the status quo for the next forty years, and economic liberty reached its lowest ebb as
conservative jurists disavowed unenumerated protections.23 2 Laws that appeared
solely protectionist in nature were upheld so long as "the discriminatory legislation
arguably advance[d] either the general welfare or a public interest,"233 of which
consumer safety and health interests regularly fell under. But in the new millennium,
lower courts have been increasingly reluctant to identify public interests in licensing
laws that facially favor one group of citizens over another.
In 2002, the Sixth Circuit delivered the first major victory for the anti-licensing
movement. In Craigmiles v. Giles, the court considered a challenge to a Tennessee
234
law that restricted anyone but a state-licensed funeral director from selling caskets.
The statute did not originally include any mention of casket transactions, but it was
225

David E. Bernstein, The Due Process Rght to Pursuea Lawful Occupation:A BrighterFuture

Ahead? 126 YALE LJ.F. 287, 296 (Dec. 5, 2016), www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-due-processright-to-pursue-a-lawfiul-occupation-a-brighter-future-ahead [https://perma.cc/9GT9-2X2U].
226 See, e.g., supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
227

2
229

See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
See id. at 728, 731.
Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 591, 596-97 (1917).

2 Id. at 593-94. The Court acknowledged that this industry was prone to abuse, but it reiterated
that "this is not enough to justify destruction of one's right to follow a distinctly useful calling in an upright

way." Id. at 594.
231 Ferguson,372 U.S. at 732.
232

See supranotes 124-127 and accompanying text.

Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
234 Craigmies v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 2002).
233
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later amended to include the sale of funeral merchandise. 23 5 Additionally, the
requirements for obtaining a license were quite substantial,2 3 6 and the plaintiffswho sold caskets but performed no funeral services-argued that these requirements
were arbitrary, unnecessary, and existed solely to restrict competition for the benefit
of covered funeral homes. 2 3 7
The Sixth Circuit agreed: "adding the retail sale of funeral merchandise to the
definition of funeral directing was nothing more than an attempt to prevent
economic competition" 2 38 because "[t]his specific action of requiring licensure . .
appears directed at protecting licensed funeral directors from retail price
competition."23 While the court acknowledged that "[r]ational basis review[] . .
does not require the best or most finely honed legislation to be passed," 24 it rejected
the state's arguments that there was a reasonable relationship between the legislation
in question and any legitimate public interest, such as consumer protection or public
health.24 1 Consequently, the law failed even the most deferential level of scrutiny, as
'protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate
governmental purpose.' 24 2 The plaintiffs were thus vindicated on both Due Process
and Equal Protection grounds. 24 3
The Cragmilesopinion has resulted in a circuit split as courts have examined
similar licensing schemes, and it is one that anti-regulatory advocates appear to be
winning. In Powers v Haris,the Tenth Circuit upheld a casket retailing law similar
to the one considered in Craigmiles.24 But rather than attempt to distinguish the
facts of the case from what the Sixth Circuit examined, the Tenth Circuit simply
disagreed with its findings: "absent a violation of a specific constitutional provision
or other federal law, intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a legitimate state
interest." 2 45 The court warned that "adopting a rule against the legitimacy of
intrastate economic protectionism and applying it in a principled manner would have
wide-ranging consequences," 2 46 which could "paralyze state governments if [judges]

235

id.

236 To become a licensed funeral director under Tennessee's Funeral
Directors and Embalmers Act,

one was required to "complete eitherone year of course work at an accredited mortuary school andthen a
one-year apprenticeship with a licensed funeral director or a two-year apprenticeship." Id. (emphasis in
original).
237 Id. at 222-23.
238 Id. at 225.
239 Id. at 227.
24
0 id.
241 Id. at 225-28.
242 Id. at 224.
243 Id at 228-29 ("None of the justifications offered by the state satisfies the slight review required
by rational basis review under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment."). The court declined to review the plaintiffs Privilege and Immunities argument, thereby
avoiding the Slaughter-Housequandary. Id. at 229.
244 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1211-12, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004).
245 Id. at 1221.
246 Id. at 1222.
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undertook a probing review of each of their actions, constantly asking them to 'try
again. '247
In support of its argument that economic protectionism could itself be a
legitimate public interest, the Tenth Circuit cited four cases- Wilatnson among
them-where the Supreme Court ostensibly endorsed such a conclusion.2 48 This was
a dubious assertion, though. As a concurring opinion noted, those cases still "rest[ed]
[up]on [the] fundamental foundation" that the statutes in question could arguably
protect the general welfare.2 4 9 To the contrary, "[n]o case holds that the bare
preference of one economic actor while furthering no greater public interest advances
a legitimate state interest." 250 The Tenth Circuit nonetheless teased that "such a
libertarian paradise may be a worthy goal," and added insult to injury by parroting
Justice Holmes: "Plaintiffs must turn to the Oklahoma electorate for its institution,
not us."25 1
25 2
"[T]he
Powers generated swift and vigorous disgust from libertarian stalwarts.
Tenth Circuit's rule means that laws enacted solely for the private benefit of
particular interest groups satisfies the rational basis test," ensuing scholarship
complained, proclaiming that "[s]uch a holding is inconsistent with the principle of
lawfulness[.]" 25 3 However, subsequent cases have rejected the Tenth Circuit's
conclusion in favor of the reasoning extant in Cadgmiles.
In Merriield v. Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit determined that a California
licensing law regarding pesticide removal was not rationally related to a legitimate
public interest insofar as the law exempted persons controlling "vertebrate pests" but
did not cover mice, rats, or pigeons. 254 The "irrational singling out of three types of
vertebrate pests from all other vertebrate animals" constituted economic

Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1220-21 (citing Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003);
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 18 (1992); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 298 (1976);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)).
249 Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225 (Tymkovich, J., concurring); see also Menashi & Ginsburg, supranote
39, at 1079-85.
250 Powers, 379 F.3d at 1226 (internal quotations marks omitted). Judge Tymkovich ultimately
concurred in the ruling because "the funeral licensing scheme here furthers, however imperfectly, an
element of consumer protection." Id. at 1226-27.
251 Id. at 1222.
252 See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Burying Economic Liberty, CRIME &FEDERALISM (Jan. 11, 2005,
http://federalism.typepad.com/crime-federalism/2005/01/burying-economi.html
5:14
PM),
[https://perma.cc/474B-ZKE8] ("Powers v. Harnis [is] probably the most disastrous case for economic
freedom in the last seventy years."); Eugene Volokh, Economic Liberty, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 11,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_01_07.shtml#1105465567
AM),
2005,
11:46
[https://perma.cc/5NQH-9K4Q] ("[T]he court of appeals held that, under its view of the Constitution,
naked economic favoritism is quite permissible[.]").
253 Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State Interest? FourRecent Cases Test
the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1035 (2006) (emphasis in original).
254 Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 980, 992 (9th Cir. 2008).
247
248
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protectionism by the legislature,2 55 which violated the Equal Protection rights of
mice-intensive pest controllers. 25 6 "[E]conomic protectionism for its own sake,
regardless of its relation to the common good, cannot be said to be in furtherance of
a legitimate governmental interest," the court decreed.2 57 Similarly, in 2013 the Fifth

Circuit dispatched (yet another) casket retailing law as unrelated to a valid public
interest. 258 While "economic protection ...
may well be supported by a post hoc
perceived rationale,"259 "neither precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere
economic protection of a particular industry is a legitimate governmental purpose."260
Notably, the Supreme Court has declined certiorarionthe occupational licensing
issue despite this widening circuit split.2 6 1 Moreover, the fact patterns in the casket
cases are substantially similar, which would normally make the issue ripe for
settlement. This suggests that the Court itself is unsure of how to proceed on the
matter, content instead to let the battles wage in the lower levels. And while such
inertia appears to favor the status quo, preventing the opponents of rent-seeking
licensing laws from achieving a fifty-state victory rather than individual, regional
wins, the Court's reticence is allowing this movement to gain momentum in pursuit
of its true ambition.
B. Wolves in WoolAttire, or Would-Be Dragon-Tamers
As previously mentioned, Barnett and Bernstein are not on the front line of the
Rehabilitationist cause. With the exception of Barnett's starring role in the litigation
of Gonzales v Raiclh, 2 62 the two are merely influencers, constrained to academia and
by the glacial pace of doctrinal evolution. They do not challenge the laws themselves;
they do not fight the courtroom battles.
But there are plenty of soldiers willing to fight the good fight, supplied largely by
the Institute for Justice ("IJ"), Pacific Legal Foundation ("PLF"), and, more
tangentially, the Cato Institute-staunchly libertarian legal institutions that are in
part funded (or founded) by the Koch brother corporate tandem. 2 63 Tle Cato

255 Id. at 991.
256 Id. at 991-92.

257 Id. 992 n.15; see also id. ("[W]e agree with the Sixth Circuit in Craigmilesand reject the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in Powers v. Hanis.").
258
259

St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215,217,227 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 222-23.

260 Id. at 222.
261 See Sandefir, supra note 253, at 1025.
262 545 U.S. 1, 23-33 (2005) (rejecting Barnett's argument that the Commerce Clause prohibits
Congress from criminalizing the production and use of homegrown cannabis even if states approve its use
for medicinal purposes).
263 See Olivia Nuzzi, Ron PaulHeadnes One Koch Brothers Event-as
RandPaulSkips Another,
DAILY BEAST (Aug. 3, 2015, 1:01 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/03/ron-paulheadlines-one-koch-brothers-event-as-rand-paul-skips-another.html
[https://perma.cc/MC42-LJAC];
see also Beutler, supra note 134.
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264
Institute is a think tank that funds the research of many libertarian academics,
while the IJ and PLF employ members of Cato's roster to seek out and challenge
265
statutes that implicate economic liberty or property rights. The favorite targets of
these outfits are the state licensing laws at issue in their ongoing campaign against
protectionism; the cases discussed in the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits all
involved plaintiffs represented by either the IJ or PLF. But the licensing laws are
mere skirmishes in comparison to the organizations' loftier goal: to restore economic
due process as a recognized doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed,
they fully intend to one day unleash the Lochner dragon and re-write the last 80
years of economic regulation.
Consider Clark M. Neily III, former Senior Attorney for the IJ and director of
266
Neily certainly speaks the Rehabilitationists'
its Center for Judicial Engagement.
language, rebuking most government activity in the economic sphere as "[c]urrying
favor with rent-seeking special interests by saddling their competitors with
anticompetitive business regulations," while dismissing the famed CaroleneProducts
67
case as a "baseless decision."2 The question going forward concerning economic
liberty, Neily brazenly states, is "whether the government's willingness to
misrepresent its true ends in court should entitle it to a free pass from the judiciary
to violate the Constitution." 2 68 The IJ, which refers to the liberty of contract as "a
freedom with deep roots in the common law" and describes Lochner in familiar
revisionist prose, 2 69 has become "a proving ground for aspiring, ideologically
270
IfS
committed lawyers" who wish to join Neily in toppling the modem regime.
co-founder Clint Bolick, a surprise nomination to the Arizona Supreme Court in
2016,271 has exalted Lochner as "a celebration of freedom of enterprise and freedom

26 Both Barnett and Bernstein operate under the Cato umbrella, currently serving as a research fellow,
Randy E. Barnett, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/people/randy-barnett [https://perma.cc/MR48FBZ6] (last visited Feb. 4, 2018), and adjunct scholar of the Institute, respectively. DavidE. Bernstein,
CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/people/david-bernstein [https://perma.cc/MB29-RRUDI (last
visited Feb. 4, 2018).
265 See, e.g., Current Economic Liberty Cases, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/pillar/economicliberty/?posttype=case [https://perma.cc/3PJ7-QIUF] (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
266 Clark Neily, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/people/clark-neily [https://perma.cc/SX7P-

U8P2] (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
267 Paul Larkin, David Bernstein, Randy Barnett & Clark Neily, Economic Liberty and the
Constitution: An Introduction, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/the[https://perma.cc/92ZWconstitution/report/economic-liberty-and-the-constitution-introduction

P7RY].
268

269

d
Lochner

v.

New

York

(1905),

INST.

FOR JUST.,

engagement/programs/engagement-in-action/lochner-v-new-york-190

5

http://ij.org/center-for-judicial[https://perma.cc/SY85/

ECB5] (last visited Feb. 4,2018); id. ("[T]he law [behind Lochned was the product of a zealous lobbying
effort on the part of large factory bakeries and their unionized staff who sought to limit competition from
recent immigrants who made up for their lack of mechanized facilities by working longer hours.").
270 Beutler, supra note 134.
271 See Ian Millhiser, The Most ChilingPoliicalAppointmentthat You've ProbablyNever Heard
of THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 6, 2016, 6:01 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/the-most-chilling-political-
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of contract, and a repudiation of government paternalism and excessive regulation.

It reflects a careful and proper balancing of freedom and the state's police power."72
But perhaps no one has spent more energy fighting for Lochner than Timothy
Sandefur, a nearly fifteen-year veteran of the PLF and the current Vice President for
Litigation at the equally libertarian Goldwater Institute. 2 73 Sandefur combines
Barnett's zeal for unenumerated rights with Bernstein's bevy of scholarship, having
written dozens of articles in law reviews and the Cato Institute's journals while
challenging many licensing laws in court. 2 74 Fascinatingly, Sandefur, an atheist,275
defends natural rights jurisprudence with an almost religious fervor, asserting its
place as a "sound philosophical position" despite the frequency with which
intellectuals "dismiss the notion of natural rights as mysticism or emotionalism[.]2 7 6
Indeed, the very concept of inalienable, inherent rights-and their apparent
endorsement of economic liberty-forms the core of Sandefur's legal worldview, and
it leads him to venerate Justice Field as "one of the great figures in the history of
American liberty."2 7 7
Here, Sandefur has found a kindred spirit. In the same vein that Sandefur
considers post-Lochner economic jurisprudence to be a "perversion of legal
authority," 2 78 Justice Field once decried New Orleans's regulatory efforts to remove
rotting livestock entrails from its streets and waters as "similar in principle and as
odious in character as the restrictions imposed in the [eighteenth] century upon the
peasantry in some parts of France. "279

appointment-that-youve-probably-never-heard-of-d2b083al53ab/
[https://perma.cc/T9JR-GPUD].
But see George Leef, Justice Bolck Fightens the Statists, FORBES (an. 11, 2016, 3:00 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2016/01/11/justice-bolick-frightens-thestatists/#2fe5b639498a [https://perma.cc/37EN-FUG6] (responding critically to Millhiser's article).
272 CLINT BOLICK, DEATH GRIP: LOOSENING THE LAW'S STRANGLEHOLD OVER EcONoviC
LIBERTY 46 (2011).
273
Timothy
Sandefur,
Curriculum
Vitae,
http://sandefiir.typepad.com/CV.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SCD4-UY4Y] (last updated Nov. 2017).
274 id
275
See Timothy Sandefur, A Protestant Atheist, FREESPACE (Apr. 16, 2005),
http://sandefur.typepad.com/freespace/2005/04/i think thomas .html
[https://perma.cc/3EAP3L7N].
276 Timothy Sandefur, The Conscience of the Constitution: An Introduction, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 13, 2014, 10:26 AM), http://volokh.com/2014/01/13/conscience-constitutionintroduction/ [https://perma.cc/Q7TS-NSPP]. One professor replied to Sandefur's article in comic
fashion: "Tim, can you discuss how your views of the U.S. Constitution have been influenced by the
writings of Ayn Rand?" Orin Kerr, Comment to The Conscience ofthe Constitution:AnIntroduction,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 13, 2014, 10:26 AM), http://volokh.com/2014/01/13/conscienceconstitution-introduction/ [https://perma.cc/Q7TS-NSPP].
27 7
See Timothy Sandefur, HappyBirthday, Stephenj Field!, FREESPACE (Nov. 4, 2010,2:28 PM),
http://sandefur.typepad.com/freespace/2010/11/happy-birthday-stephen-j-field.html
[https://perma.cc/A6KW-XB4X]; see also Eastman & Sandefur, supra note 52, at 125.
278 Sandefur, supranote 253, at 1042.
1
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 92 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting); see also
MILLHISER, supra note 44, at 11. For a grisly image of Slaughter-House-eraNew Orleans, see BEATIY,
supranote 45, at 117-20.
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Viewed through this lens, it is impossible to interpret the state licensing lawsuits
as anything more than pawns in an increasingly contentious game of chess. These
occupational statutes, which often impose steep barriers to entry on small-time
entrepreneurs and business owners, represent easy game for attorneys steeped in years
of economic liberty-based literature. But just as civil rights activists contemplated
broader concepts of justice when protesting the segregation of bus seats and water
fountains, libertarian organizations will be happy to re-litigate Lochner when the
opportunity finally presents itself.28 0
IV. "ON TO THE PLAIN AND IN THE DAYLIGHT": A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO
PRESERVE THE MODERN STATE

Until that time comes to fight for economic due process in its barest terms, the
Rehabilitationists will continue to call attention to oppressive economic legislation
and convert new adherents of activism. As The New Repubic elaborates, there is a
reason why libertarian lawyers are content to fight the first battles on these terms:
Barnett and his contemporaries prefer to root their arguments in specific
injustices rather than categorical abstractions. Why shouldn't bakers be
allowed to work more than [sixty] hours a week, or individuals be allowed
to remain uninsured? Why should the government be allowed to regulate
out of existence my right to hail a driver or your right to rent a stranger's
house for a weekend?"
These "categorical abstractions," of course, represent the main engines of the
modern economy, and the debate centers on what the government's level of
involvement in their machination should be. Libertarian ideology calls into question
many of the regulatory measures that emerged from the Great Depression's rubble,
and legal figures within the movement like Barnett and Epstein have dedicated much
of their careers to explaining why this skepticism is constitutionally vindicated.
While the traditional narrative of Lochner too frequently strays into hysteria,
prophesizing the return of child labor and cutthroat work weeks should liberty of
contract regain the high ground, 28 2 it is undeniable that the Rehabilitationists have a

280 Cf Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1950) (integrating the University of Texas's law

school under Plessys "separate but equal" doctrine). The author analogizes these movements in strategy
only.
281 Beutler, supra note 134 (original emphasis omitted).
282 See id ("[A] president who adopted [a] ... model, with the goal of rehabilitating Lochner, could
erode the legal and administrative foundations of the past century in a matter of years."); Erik Loomis,
Creeping Lochnerism, LAW.,
GUNS & MONEY
(Sept.
1,
2015,
7:34 AM),
http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2015/09/creeping-lochnerism [https://perma.cc/25HC-6SFP];
see also 151 CONG. REC. 11,841 (2005) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("A return to the Lochner era would
mean a return to a time without protections against child labor.").
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profoundly different vision of America than many of the New Deal's benefactors.2 83
Opposition to that vision should be framed not by long-expunged horrors of
centuries past, but in terms of basic material conditions that the dragon's release puts
at risk.
Bernstein, though claiming to be a mere spectator in this war for the heart and
soul of the free market, has crafted a powerful narrative of economic liberty's roots
in American common law and tragic demise at the hands of Progressive statists, to
which its renaissance would be a logical and merited conclusion.2 84 But this parable,
now boilerplate in Lochner revisionism, falls flat on crucial fronts. The
Rehabilitationists simultaneously overstate the liberty of contract's precedents while
whitewashing its radical origins, and waste time defeating strawmen to excuse
Lochneis case but not its doctrine. 28 5 These corrections ultimately fail to
demonstrate why economic due process should be revitalized in the modern age,
further solidifying this author's belief that our nation's "desultory affair with
economic libertarianism" should be confined to a one-time affair. 28 6

A. "CountHis Teeth and Claws"
Bernstein's RehabilitatingLochner,287 it must be conceded, is a compelling work
of historical depth, and it rectifies the record in several areas pertaining to Lochner
and its era. The Supreme Court during this time-i.e. the forty years that spanned
the Allgeyer and West Coast Hotel decisions-did not, for instance, strike down
broad swaths of economic regulation at every opportunity afforded to it; in fact, it
upheld far more regulatory legislation than it overturned. 28 8 This alone calls the
"dragon" depicture into question, and it is further evident that Lochner's majority
was not comprised of renegade hacks. Three of these Justices had voted to uphold
the working-hours limit for coal miners in Holden,289 and Justice Harlan, author of
one of Lochner's celebrated dissents, was himself an adherent of the liberty of
contract (and, more generally, an expansive reading of the Fourteenth
283 The Cato Institute, for example, favors repealing the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair
Labor
Standards Act (including its provisions guaranteeing a minimum wage and overtime pay), the Family and
Medical Leave Act, large components of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and many more laborrelated safeguards that protect basic autonomy in the workplace. Walter Olson, Labor and Employment
Law,
in
CATO
HANDBOOK
FOR
POLICYMAKERS
615
(8th
ed.
2017),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/catohandbook-for-policymakers-8th-edition-62_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JDQ6-245U]. One can only
wonder where the Civil Rights Act slots on the chopping block.
284 See supranotes 139-155 and accompanying text.
285 SeeAMAR, supra note 9, at 562 n.26 ("[M]uch of the rest of Bernstein's book fails to engage
the
best criticisms of Lochner, preferring instead to knock down an army of straw men... . Bernstein fails to
rehabilitate Lochnereven though he does defrock Holmes.").
286 Purdy, supra note 94, at 196.
287 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 67.
288 See Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reaty: The Supreme Courtand Protective
Legislation in the

ProgressiveEra, Y.B. SUPREME CT. HIST. SoC'Y 53, 69-70 (1983).
289 BERNSTEIN, supranote 67, at 31, 33.
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Amendment). 29 0 When matters of health and safety were not at bar, Harlan would
frequently vote in favor of preserving economic liberty, even authoring the Adair
29
opinion that prompted an avalanche of Progressive ire. 1
But while Bernstein shines light on some darkened corridors, he in turn
obfuscates important criticisms. "[T]he significance of liberty-of-contract and
antiregulatory federalism doctrines was not that they became a hard-and-fast set of
rules," Jedediah Purdy observes, "but that they created, used, and, in so doing,
292
expanded a set of available constitutional arguments." While the Lochnererawas
not a great furnace, incinerating all regulations that were thrown into its flames, this
new pro-market, anti-regulatory template for debate struck down more than 200
pieces of state and federal regulations between the 1880s and 1930s, many of which
2 93
were significant in scope.
Bernstein may sing the praises of Justice Harlan and hail the three-man exodus
from Holden to Lochner as proof of the latter's orthodoxy, but the reality is that
Justices Brewer and Peckham-and their predecessor, Justice Field-receive the
29 4
lion's share of today's libertarian adulation. Indeed, the Lochnerduo embodied the
very de-regulatory essence of the ideology, having opposed state intervention into
markets of all shapes and sizes commenced under the guise of class legislation. In
addition to voting against basic legislative safeguards for the coal miners in Holden,
Justices Brewer and Peckham would have invalidated, among other things, municipal
296
regulations of waste collection; 295 the practice of mandatory smallpox vaccination;
laws forbidding employers from paying their workers in credits redeemable only at
2 9
company stores; 297 and, in Brewer's case, the very concept of progressive taxation. 8
This is not to say that Justices who came of age during the Civil War should have
spotless records by contemporary societal standards; as Bernstein makes dear, Justice
299
Holmes largely escapes criticism for several ignominious rulings. But the liberty of

290 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
291 BERNSTEIN,

supra note 67, at 45, 127.
Purdy, supra note 94, at 208.
293 Id. at 197; see also Kens, supra note 77, at 428 (noting that Justice Sutherland "was not talking
about counting cases" when he wrote that "the power to abridge [liberty of contract] ... could only be
justified by the existence of exceptional circumstances" during the Lochnerera(original emphasis omitted)
(quoting W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting))).
292

294 See MICHAEL

J. BRODHEAD,

DAVID

J. BREWER:

THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE,

1837-1910, at 186 (1994); Eastman & Sandefur, supra note 52, at 128; Ely, supra note 132, at 592;
Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some

ParmetersofLaisscz-FaireConstitutionalism, 1863-1897,61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 971 (1975).
295 Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 326, 334-35 (1905).
296 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12-13 (1905).
297

Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 606-07, 611 (1903).

298 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 110 (1900) (Brewer, J., dissenting); Magoun v. Ill. Tr. & Say.

Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 301 (1898) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
299 BERNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 45-46, 97-98. Bernstein also rightfully takes Holmes to task for
his near-dissent in an early civil rights case. Id. at 82-85.
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contract's patron saints would have weaponized the Due Process Clause in a manner
untenable to many Americans.

'

Bernstein, however, denies that laissez-faire ideology played a dominant role in
Lochner-era jurisprudence, echoing one of the first rallying cries of Lochner
revisionism." To demonstrate this, he briefly trots out nineteenth century legal
scholar Christopher Tiedeman to serve as a foil to the Lochner Court's relative
moderation.30 ' Tiedeman was a radical libertarian in the mold of Herbert Spencer,
who condemned virtually any statute regulating the hours and wages of workers as
unconstitutional, as well as usury laws, bans on narcotic drugs, and protective
tariffs. 30 2 Thus, because the Court upheld such laws by unanimous vote, it was never
the bastion of free-market constitutionalism that Tiedeman so advocated.
Even
Justices Brewer and Peckham, "[t]he most libertarian justices" of this era, "were not
nearly as radical as Tiedeman." 304
This analysis is simplistic, and the minimization of Tiedeman's influence is
consistent in Rehabilitationist scholarship.0 5 It is an especially curious omission on
the part of Bernstein, who has posited that the liberty of contract formulated mostly
at the state level. 0 6 Tiedeman, the laissez-faire figure "most explicit in articulating a
rationale for the constitutional protection of unenumerated constitutional rights," 0
was quoted favorably by lower courts in "hundreds of cases" in the decades leading
301
up to Lochner.
In 1895, for instance, the Illinois Supreme Court cited Tiedeman's
treatise on the limitations of the police power to invalidate a law that restricted
women from working more than eight hours per day or forty-eight hours per week."
A few years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited his work seven times in an
opinion that struck down the state's ban on yellow-dog contracts.310 Neither Justice

' Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
302 David N. Mayer, The Jwisprudence of ChristopherG. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failureof
3o1

Laissez-FaireConstitutionalsm, 55 MO. L. REV. 93, 99 (1990). Admirably, Tiedeman also staunchly
opposed anti-miscegenation laws. Id.
303 BERNSTEIN, supranote 67, at 21.
304
Id. at 20-21.
30s Mayer, supra note 302, at 97 ("[R]evisionist scholars have neglected one pivotal figure of laissezfaire constitutionalism: Christopher Gustavus Tiedeman.").
306 BERNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 18-19; see also Kens, supra note 141 ("[Bernstein's] work shows
that the theory combining due process of law and liberty of contract, as the Lochner majority opinion
used it in 1905, did not take hold until the late 1880s, and even then primarily in state courts."). In contrast
to Bernstein's inability to invoke founding principles in defense of the doctrine, there is an abundance of
evidence that many of the Framers supported general redistributive policies. See Ganesh Sitaraman,
Economic Structure andConstitutionaiStructure:An IntellectualHistory,94 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 132328 (2016).
307 Mayer, supranote 302, at 97.
30s Id. at 98 (citing CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL
CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT ix (The Lawbook Exhange, Ltd. 2004) (1900)). This level of influence is

remarkable considering that Tiedeman never held a judicial position. See id.
309 Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454,459 (Ill. 1895).
310 State exrel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 90 N.W. 1098, 1099-1104
(Wis. 1902).
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Brewer nor Peckham took up arms for the unlimited freedom of drug use, but their
conceptions of economic liberty were nearly identical to Tiedeman's:
Tiedeman regarded liberty of contract as a right the law should guarantee
equally to the employer and the employee. Although recognizing that the
legal equality between employer and employee was nothing more than "a
legal fiction," he nevertheless limited the legitimate regulation of the labor
contract to the preservation of the health and safety of the worker or to
the protection against fraud. All other regulation-including regulation
of workers' wages and hours-would violate the constitutional guarantee
of liberty of contract, which Tiedeman argued was "intended to operate
equally and impartially upon both employer and employee."'
Furthermore, Tiedeman's tribal fear of collectivism was well-represented among
liberty of contract advocates at all levels of the American judiciary. At the time that
Tiedeman warned "[lt]he demands of the Socialists and Communists" in America
would result in the abolition of "all private property in land" until the government
was "the sole possessor of the working capital of the nation, "312 state courts were
engaging in similar practices of red-baiting.11 3 At the Supreme Court, Justice Field
3 14
waxed poetic on the impending doom of free-market capitalism.
Justice Brewer spoke of his aversion to centralized government in the plainest of
terms. 31 s And in an amusingly bizarre episode, ChiefJustice Taft made it his dying
mission to prevent the judiciary from signing off on illegitimate redistribution in the
wake of Black Tuesday. "I must stay on the court in order to prevent the Bolsheviki
from getting control." 16 In that spirit, Taft likely would have agreed with Tiedeman's
belief that collectivism placed "natural rights . . . in imminent danger of serious
infringement."3 17 This is not to say that the liberty of contract's inception was owed
311 Mayer, supranote 302, at 140 (footnotes omitted); see also Millhiser, supra note 141, at 514-17
(tying proto-Lochnerian decisions to Tiedeman's writings).
312 Mayer, supra note 302, at 117-18 (quoting CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS

OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 80 (1890)).
313 See MILLHISER, supra note 44, at 89.
311

See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607 (1895) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The

present assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the stepping-stone to others, larger and
more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of the poor against the rich; a war constantly
growing in intensity and bitterness."); see also Cachin, supra note 44, at 574-76 (describing Field's
hostility toward what he perceived to be "socialistic" legislation).
31s

See Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("The paternal theory

of government is to me odious. The utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fislest possible
protection to him and his property, is both the limitation and duty ofgovemment."); see alsoBRODHEAD,
supra note 294, at 121 ("Brewer sympathized with [the Populist] goal of a better distribution of material
things but feared that they were ignoring the 'lessons of history' and that their programs would lead to
socialism."); Purdy, supranote 94, at 211 n.85.
316 Hunter, supra note 33, at 35.
317 TIEDEMAN, supra note 312, at 80.
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solely to an ideological dichotomy between collectivist redistribution and libertarian
intransigence, or even that it was a defining influence on the Court. As many of
Bernstein's predecessors have argued, economic due process sprung largely from

"[t]he Jacksonian distaste for granting special economic privilege and preference for
competition," which "had a significant impact on constitutional thought" of the
generation wherein the doctrine was incubated.3 1 ' But it is reasonable to believe, as
Purdy does, that "there was a mutually reinforcing relationship between the
prominence of laissez-faire thinking and the shape the Court gave to substantive due
process[.]"" Given both the influence of a radical libertarian, like Tiedeman, in the
doctrine's nascent stages and the loaded rhetoric of the Justices themselves, one can
safely say that "laissez-faire thinking infused strands of elite and popular thinking"
of the era.3 2 0
Put another way, one would be hard-pressed to envision a situation in which
Lochner revanchists fail to draw inferences from a constitutional doctrine that: (1)
was espoused by a Marxist professor in its infancy, (2) supported with recurrent
citations to Das Kapitalby state-court judges, and (3) eventually adopted by leftleaning Justices that engaged in overtly redistributive rhetoric. By disclaiming laissezfaire's influence in this era as Progressive myopia, revisionist scholarship has in turn
"produced a myth of its own."321
B. "Seefust WhatdIs His Strength"
Libertarian scholars may debate the degree to which laissez-faire politics
permeated Lochner-era jurisprudence, but the Rehabilitationists face an uphill battle
today on optics alone. One of the liberty of contract's most enduring criticisms during
the Progressive era was that it failed to account for-and actively preserved-unequal
bargaining power between employer and employee.322 Chiefly, the Court's
conception of substantive due process ignored "the actual facts of inequality as

318 Ely, supranote 132, at 595; see also Les Benedict, supra note 67, at 318-21, 327-31 (detailing the
impact of Jacksonian ideals on the opposition to class legislation). Revisionists, though, have greatly
exaggerated anti-monopolist and "Free Soil, Free Labor" ideals of Jacksonian democracy as influences
specific to the field. See Cachan, supra note 44, at 550-64. These scholars have misinterpreted Field's
rhetoric in his Slaughter-Housedissentto mean that he was a Free-Soil advocate in the abolitionist sense,
even though Field was plainly speaking in terms of laissez-faire. Id. at 568-69. Moreover, revisionists have
likely erred in their broader assumptions of Gilded Age jurisprudence. See William E. Forbath, The
Ambiguities ofFree Labor: Laborand the Law in the GildedAge, 1985 WS. L. REv. 767, 790 (1985)
(observing the transformation of "Jacksonian protest vocabulary into a defense of the few against the
many"); Kens, supra note 77, at 416-19.
"'Jedediah Purdy, Lochner and Liberty. A Response to David Bernstein, DEMOCRACY (Dec. 20,
2011, 10:15 AM), http://democracyjournal.org/arguments/lochner-and-liberty-a-response-to-davidbernstein/ [https://perma.cc/3YDJ-82NP].
320 Id. Justice Holmes, casting a watchful eye, observed as early as 1897 that "[w]hen socialism first
began to be talked about, the comfortable classes of the community were a good deal frightened. I suspect
that this fear has influenced judicial action both here and in England ..... Holmes, supra note 2, at 467.
321 Kens, supranote 77, at 430.
322 See supra notes 63-94 and accompanying text.
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between employer and employee in bargaining for labor in many sorts of
employment," wrote Progressive scholar Roscoe Pound in an influential law review
article.3 23 The Justices appeared to be unfamiliar with "actual industrial conditions"
that created "practical conditions of inequality[,]" obstinately treating labor contracts
3 24
as if the parties "were farmers haggling over the sale of a horse[.]" Purdy conveys
a more sympathetic account, but he reaches the same conclusion:
In effect, the Court decided that constitutional doctrines that blocked
some economic regulations were the best way to define a new version of
American citizenship that made everyone equally free for the first time.
The problem was not that they were insincere or inane, but that they were
325
wrong- Everyone wasn't equally free.
Ergo, Libertarians that still insist on enforcing a liberty to contract may run
aground when confronted with age-old questions of employee bargaining power, just
as universal healthcare advocates who campaign for a constitutional "right to life"
doctrine would risk exposing themselves to charges of hypocrisy on the abortion
front. Some Rehabilitationists seem willing to concede this loss and have proactively
sought to re-brand its arguments. Sandefur, for example, has long crusaded for the
3 26
while
"right to earn a living" as the modern standard for economic liberty,
Bernstein recently unveiled the more wonkish "right to pursue a lawful
occupation."

327

These slogans are packaged as sensible solutions to the oppressive licensing laws
2
currently at issue-the "specific injustices" belying the "categorical abstractions.' 3 8
But, they are mere vessels for the goal of the last thirty years of Lochnerrevisionism.
This is the Trojan Horse through which economic due process enters the city, and
it is why Colby and Smith predict that "conservative legal thought will soon gravitate
329
to the view that the Constitution requires judicial protection for economic liberty."
Whether it is initially advanced by the modest proposal of the "rational basis with a
33 0
or eventually by the
bite" concept adopted in the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits,
more robust approach of installing Lochner-esque strict scrutiny review for all

Pound, supra note 152, at 486.
Id. at 454.
325 Purdy, supra note 32; see also BEATY, supra note 45, at 160 ("In the name of preserving the
phantasmal economic independence of the American worker, [liberty of contract] denied him, her, and
the kids the rudiments of economic security.").
326 See Timothy Sandefur, State "Competitor's Veto"Laws and the Right to Earn a Living: Some
Paths to FederalReform, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1009, 1072 (2015); see genezly SANDEFUR,
supranote 157; Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207 (2003).
327 See Bernstein, supranote 225, at 302-03.
328 Beutler, supra note 134.
329 Colby & Smith, supra note 30, at 600.
"3 See supra note 223 and accompanying text; supra Section III.A.
323

324
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economic regulation, "[t]he stage is now set for new originalist defenses of economic
liberties."
Bernstein inadvertently offers a vision of what the future may hold. "Even if one
disagrees with the outcome of some of the liberty of contract era's due process cases,"
Bernstein argues, "the principle established in those cases-that the police power is
not infinitely elastic-is a sound one[.]" 3 32 This jurisprudence, which allowed states
to regulate behavior to preserve matters of public health, safety, or morals, 33 is
'preferable to the existing mainstream Progressive alternative emphasizing almost
judicial total deference to legislation."3 3 4
Reviving Lochner means reinstituting the police power as the de facto standard
of review for economic regulation, and it requires courts to evaluate laws with a
"presumption of liberty' rather than. . . a presumption of deference. "M On its face,
this is a reasonable benchmark; the descriptors of health, safety, and morals seem to
cover a lot of territory. In reality, they served as a constraint against achieving the
sort of reforms that today are so commonplace as to feel institutional. A statute that
could not be justified under one of these categories was condemned as a "labor law,
pure and simple "'3 6 which could not be deployed to remedy "inequalities of
fortune." 3 For this reason, the Court was uniformly hostile towards laws that
stipulated wage floors or guaranteed unions the right to organize workers-neither
could be externally justified as preserving an inherent communal good.
With rational basis review effectively exiled, what would the police power mean
in modern times? Despite Lochneis infamy having centered around its rejection of
a limit upon working hours, maximum working hours regulations would likely pass
constitutional muster today due to the abundance of research that connects longer
working schedules to health problems. 3 But minimum wage laws and bans on
yellow-dog contracts lie on shakier ground. What health reasons could justify wage
floors, which are enacted specifcally to remedy an inequality of fortune? Studies
evaluating the efficacy of wage floors in increasing the standard of living often reveal

Colby & Smith, supranote 30, at 600.
supranote 67, at 127.
3 See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
334 BERNSTEIN, supranote 67, at 127.
ass Rosen, supra note 133.
336 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
33 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915). Indeed, the Court explicitly endorsed the notion of
economic inequality- "[I]t is . .. impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary
result of the exercise of those rights." Id Perhaps no greater ode to capitalism has ever been penned by a
sitting Justice.
" See, e.g., Claire Zillman, Science Says Working Long Hours A Seriously Bad for Your Heath,
FORTUNE
(Aug.
20,
2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/08/20/working-long-hours-health/
[https://perma.cc/4QM3-KP6B].
331

332 BERNSTEIN,

2017-2018

Burying Lochner Why Courts Should Reject Coming
Attempts to Revive Economic Due Process

505

mixed results,'" and some even suggest that they are counterintuitive."
Furthermore, the utility of organized labor is an inherently political debate that
would be unlikely to trigger one of the police power's protections. The Lochner
Court struck down pro-union laws under the belief that labor unions did not "directly
ameliorate working conditions,"34 ' an argument that today's conservatives would
likely echo.34 2 In both instances, it is difficult to see a neo-Lochnerist Court ignore
the infringement on economic liberty-the liberty that equally guarantees both
employer and employee the right to bargain for whatever price and terms they
desire 3 4 3-that occurs when a government mandates a certain wage be paid or bans
businesses from attaching anti-union terms to its employment contracts.
Less heralded but equally perilous is what such a Court would do to resolve
Adams and Ferguson, the cases that dealt with state authority to prohibit "injurious
practices" of businesses, such as upfront fees from employment agencies or nonsanctioned debt-adjusting. 3" Restrictive laws like the one in Ferguson could very
well be on the chopping block, as they reek of the type of paternalism that legal
libertarians are eager to challenge. Why should debt-adjusting be limited to lawyers
if citizens wish to contract with experts in other fields? 4 5 Why should employment
agents not ensure themselves payment while providing a service that is "useful,
commendable, and in great demand"?" An Adams-esque redux in a Lochnerfriendly climate would be unlikely to trigger a morality exception, as the Old Court
found "nothing inherently immoral or dangerous to public welfare" in charging
immediate fees from people least able to pay them.34 7

"

See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE EFFECTS OF A MINIMUM-WAGE INCREASE ON

&

EMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY INCOME (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113thcongress-2013-2014/reports/44995-MinimumWage.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5H8-E9Q7].
3 See Joseph J. Sabia, Minimum Wages: A Poor Way to Reduce Poverty, CATO INST. TAX
(Mar. 2014), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbb_70.pdf
BUDGET BULL.,
[https://perma.cc/GTB8-XW54].
341 BERNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 53.
342 See, e.g., Matt Ford, A NarrowEscapefor Publc-SectorUnions, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 29, 2016),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/friedrichs-supreme-court-decision/470103/

[https://perma.cc/H3QL-GHWV].
343 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) ("The right [to liberty of contract] is as essential to the
laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest
way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money.").
344 See supra notes 226-231 and accompanying text.
345 See generallyGeorge C. Leef, The Case for a FreeMarket in Legal Services, CATO INST. (Oct.
9, 1998), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa322xa.pdf
[https:/perma.cc/Y5P8-

NVXT].
346 Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 593 (1917).
3

See id.
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C "To Kill Him or to Tame Him"
Surveying the landscape, this author sees an untenable relationship between
rising libertarian sentiments and protectionist state licensing laws. Lying in the
crossfire is the very heart of American regulation: the separation of economic and
social liberties. As Purdy elucidates, "[N]eo-Lochnerism supposes that the
distinction between politics and markets, or principles and interests, is spurious: A
democratically adopted policy is just the aggregation of some people's interests, and
a company's economic interests make as worthy a basis for political argument as any
principle." 348 As previously demonstrated, the leveling of this playing field would
eliminate many redistributive and regulatory policies that Americans regard as
necessary in reducing economic inequality.
The author of this Note proposes a compromise to save the baby (if not the
bathwater). Liberal jurists should concede to the Rehabilitationists a victory on the
licensing-law front, and they should embrace it as a fortification of rational basis
review rather than a capitulation. Without resorting to libertarian rhetoric in the vein
of cronyism and rent-seeking, liberals can agree that economic protectionism is not
a legitimate public interest for legislatures to promote.
As liberal legal scholar Cass Sunstein has long contended, protectionist laws
violate the common law principle of prohibiting legislators from enacting their
"naked preferences" into law. 3 4 9 Jeffrey Rosen has further argued that governments
may only "regulate economic liberties in the public interest," as "regulations that
benefit private interests are ultra vires and unconstitutional."so "The most naked
wealth transfers from one group to another" could be invalidated, Rosen suggests,
"but everything else would be upheld as legislation in the public interest."3,s
This author does not reach Rosen's level of speculation with regard to class
legislation, nor does he flirt with Rosen's concept of "rational basis with a bite;"352
rational basis simply needs to be applied rationally. If Lochner-consciousliberals are
reluctant to expand its scope under Due Process challenges, these judges can strike
down protectionist statutes on Equal Protection grounds for unreasonably favoring
certain businesses. While liberals "tend to have faith in the capacity of government
regulation," Bernstein chides that egalitarians should be more "concerned with
dismantling laws that institutionalize and enforce unearned privilege."s" After all,
34s Purdy, supranote 94, at 202.
349 Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1690
(1984).
.so Jeffrey Rosen, Class Legislation, PubAc Choice, and the StructuralConstitution, 21 HARV. J.L.
&PUB. POL'Y 181, 181 (1997).
351 Id. at 193. Of course, Rosen is not proposing that redistribution perseis unconstitutional, as most
wealth transfers serve a legitimate interest: "As long as there is a plausible argument that minimum wage
laws, for example, serve the public interest, rather than representing naked wealth transfers, courts should
uphold them." Id. at 190.
352 See id. at 192-93.
.s. Bernstein, supranote 225, at 297-98. To be sure, libertarians do not have a monopolyon licensing
law criticism. Dean Baker has frequently assailed occupational licensing legislation (and rent-seeking writ
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licensing laws disproportionately favor native-born whites as opposed to immigrants
and people of color.3 54
The Rehabilitationists score a point here, but their ultimate triumph-the
unconditional surrender of New Deal jurisprudence by way of the dragon's returnwould constitute a massive overreach. Markets are not "natural phenomena, arising
from their own organic principles and free human action,"355 and a doctrine that
constitutionalizes this theory should be actively avoided. Instances of Progressive-era
profligacy do not warrant the resurgence of an anachronistic worldview, regardless of
whatever name it goes under.
Furthermore, this author's proposal is a mild one in the greater scheme of
constitutional warfare, and it is downright milquetoast when compared to more
ambitious leftist projects. Joseph Fishkin and William E. Forbath, for example, have
begun to advance their vision of an "Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, "356 which centers
on "the nation's distribution of opportunity, wealth[,] and power."35 ' "Extreme
concentrations of economic and political power undermine equal citizenship and
equal opportunity," Fishkin and Forbath write, the reality of which is "incompatible
with, and a threat to, the American constitutional scheme.""s They cite the
Jacksonian era,35 ' the Populist and Progressive movements, 6 0 and the New Deal 6
as key points in history that embodied a legitimate ideal of redistributive justice, and

large) from the left for unduly protecting professional-class workers, inflating their pay, and ultimately
exacerbating inequality. See, e.g., Dean Baker, The Compensation of Highly PaidProfessiona&: How
Much Is Rent? 3 (Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research, Working Paper, 2016);
http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/highly-paid-professionals-2016-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FPEV934]; see also Dean Baker, The Upward Redistribution ofIncome: Are Rents the Story? 1 (Ctr. for,
Econ. & Policy Research, Working Paper, 2015), http://cepr.net/documents/working-paper-upwarddistribution-income-rents.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SZ8-GCVB].
1s See Stuart Dorsey, OccupationalLicensing and Minorities, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 171, 17275 (1983). But see Peter Q Blair & Bobby W. Chung, OccupationalLicensing Reduces Racial and
Gender Wage Gaps Evidencefrom the Swvey ofIncome and ProgramParticipation1 (Human Capital
2017-050,
2017),
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https://econresearch.uchicago.edu/sites/econresearch.uchicago.edu/files/BlairChung_2017licensingg
enderracialwage-gaps.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PUA-7R3Z] (finding that occupational licensing laws
benefit licensed minority and female job applicants by "enabl[ing] firms to rely less on race and gender as
predictors of worker productivity").
.ss Purdy, supra note 32; see also Nicole M. Aschoff, The Free-MarketFantasy,JACOBIN (Apr. 15,
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/04/free-market-conscious-capitalism-govemment/
2015),
[https://perna.cc/PD7Q-YVLR] ("Designating the market as natural and the state as unnatural is a
convenient fiction for those wedded to the status quo. It makes the current distribution of power, wealth,
and resources seem natural and thus inevitable and uncontestable.").
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remark that many of our current struggles reflect the regulatory battles of the
Lochnerera.3 62
This manifesto-a full-frontal assault on the constitutionality of economic
inequality, juxtaposed with the hands-off approach required by rational basis
review-could conceivably serve as the Left's answer to the Rehabilitationist
movement. Increased awareness of wealth inequality "intensifies concerns about
oligarchy, the state of the middle class, and the prospects of inclusion,"3 63 and it is
one of the catalysts for what Fishkin and Forbath hope will reverse the "Great
Forgetting" of anti-oligarchy principles that taints modern discourse.3 64 The
problem, they insist, is that the Left tends to not think of these quandaries as
constitutional issues, which cedes ground to the Right to re-state the case for laissezfaire constitutionalism. 6 s But if "liberals and progressives ... could respond" to these
anti-regulatory arguments "with a rekindled account of the broader commitments
embodied in the distributive Constitution," 6 6 then conservatives would no longer be
able to monopolize a sense of guardianship to the document and its text. Only then
can the Left return to "[a]ddressing the problem of oligarchy in a modern capitalist
society."367

In the meantime, courts need not contemplate these far-reaching questions.
These debates are complicated and consequential, but the immediate solution is
simple. Judges should decide what they know to be true that economic
protectionism is not rationally related to a legitimate public interest, and thus runs
afoul of non-favorited citizens' Equal Protection rights-without accepting the
merits of the Rehabilitationists' extremist enterprise.
CONCLUSION: "AN ENLIGHTENED SKEPTICISM"

The liberty of contract came to power at a time when "the rise of industrial
capitalism and a vast population of wage laborers made [it] . . . pervasively relevant
at the turn of the last century." 6 8 This concept of economic due process, which was
intended to "constitutionally protect certain transactions that lie at the core of the
economy,"16' radically altered the terrain of constitutional law by setting strict
parameters under the Fourteenth Amendment concerning what governments could

or could not enact as ameliorative legislation. But "[m]ore important than the
362 Id. at 690 ("Today, as class inequalities have returned to Gilded Age levels, our political system is
beginning to refight a striking number of the great political-economic battles of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries . . . .").
36
Jedediah Purdy, Overcomingthe GreatForgetting:AComment on Fishkin andForbath,94 TEX.
L. REv. 1415, 1417 (2016) (previewing Fishkin and Forbath's forthcoming scholarship in this realm).
364 Id. at 1415.
36s See id, at 1416. See generally William E. Forbath, Workers' Rights and the Distributive
Constitution, DISSENT, Spring 2012, at 58.
366 Forbath, supra note 365,
at 64.
367 Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 356,
at 692.
361 Purdy, supra note 94, at
202.
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holding in Lochner"--or any individual case of the era-was the fear that
recognizing class conflict "would open a Pandora's box of insidious state intervention
in the economy."37 0 All but the most fervent supporters of free and unimpeded
markets should admit that the Justices, who "were well aware of increasingly volatile
relationships between labor and management, as well as spiraling economic
inequality," failed to foresee the consequences of unleashing unfettered capitalism
upon a shackled workforce.3 7 1
Today, opinion is mixed as to the merit ofJustice Holmes's dissent in Lochner,
generally splitting along ideological lines. While revisionist scholarship continues to
question the narrative that placed Lochner alongside Dred Scott and Plessyin the
"Malebolge of rejected rulings,"3 72 Holmes's opinion serves as a lens through which
modern scholars and students can view the hallmark of Progressive-era debates. The
writing is dear, concise, and brilliant, but ultimately inaccurate in several of its
assumptions. It is true that "[t]he original Lochner era did not consist merely of
corporate toadying or crudely ideological applications of laissez-faire theory" 7 and
Holmes's scathing insistence otherwise has served as the fuel which powers the
Rehabilitationist machine.
Holmes, however, was correct in his most important assessment-that the
Constitution does not protect the form of economic liberty that Justices Field,
Peckham, and others believed to be inherently bestowed from nature. In this pivotal
moment, Holmes counted the "teeth and claws" of economic liberty, and saw just
what was its strength. And though he could not vanquish it in his own time,
Holmes's words provided the means by which future skeptics could kill the doctrine
that had prevented a more fairer and just society from emerging in the world's fastestexpanding economy.
In the original analogy broached at the outset of this Note, Holmes was speaking
broadly in terms of a historical approach to the law.37 4 The "dragon"-whether a rule,
doctrine, or an individual case-must constantly be evaluated within the context of
contemporary relevance and wisdom to determine its worth going forward. A dragon
that lives outside this realm of functionality thus should be killed, lest it run
roughshod on the hillsides of American jurisprudence.
Seen in this light, Justice Holmes made a valuable decision not to join his
brothers in taming Lochner. For those who enjoy the benefits of economic
redistribution and basic industrial regulations made possible only from the dragon's
demise, Lochnerwas not a "useful animal" to their forebears, and it never will be for
their children. The Rehabilitationists' opponents should be ready to say so once
again.

370 Hunter, supm note 33.
371id

372 Beutler, supra note 134; see alsoGreene, supra note 23, at 417-22.
37 4 Purdy,
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